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INTRODUCTION
Every year, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) apprehends
thousands of immigrant children.1 While most are apprehended crossing the
border, approximately 1,000 minors are apprehended each year through internal
enforcement efforts by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).2 This is
due in large part to a number of new programs initiated by ICE aimed at
apprehending non-citizens living within United States borders without lawful

1. Throughout this article, the terms child, youth, minor, and juvenile are used interchangeably.
These terms all refer to any individual who is under eighteen years of age. It is estimated that
approximately 100,000 youth are apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security each year.
See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, A REVIEW OF DHS’
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR JUVENILE ALIENS 4 (2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/
mgmtrpts/OIG_05-45_Sep05.pdf. The majority of these children are from Mexico and are
immediately repatriated. Id. In recent years, approximately 8,000 youth were considered
“unaccompanied alien children” and were transferred to the custody of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement. Wendy Young & Megan McKenna, The Measure of a Society: The Treatment of
Unaccompanied Refugee and Immigrant Children in the United States, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 247, 248
(2010); JACQUELINE BHABHA & SUSAN SCHMIDT, SEEKING ASYLUM ALONE: UNACCOMPANIED AND
SEPARATED CHILDREN AND REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE U.S. 17 (2006); Christopher Nugent, Whose
Children are Those? Towards Ensuring the Best Interests and Empowerment of Unaccompanied Alien
Children, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 219, 222 (2006).
2. At present, advocates do not have statistics on the exact number of children apprehended
internally each year. In FY 2010, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) placed a total of 841 youth
in either staff-secure or secure detention facilities which are largely comprised of youth apprehended
internally. However, this figure is both over-inclusive and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive
because staff-secure and secure placements also have some youth who act out or try to run away
while in shelter care, in addition to the youth apprehended internally. The number is under-inclusive
because some youth apprehended internally are also in shelter care rather than in staff-secure or
secure facilities. In addition, this figure does not include youth apprehended internally who are never
transferred from ICE custody to ORR. A 2009 report by the Women’s Refugee Commission found
that ICE will sometimes keep youth who are apprehended internally in ICE custody and will not turn
those youth over to ORR. It is unknown exactly how many children ICE retains in custody; however,
advocates believe it may be approximately 100 children each year. See M. Aryah Somers et al.,
Constructions of Childhood and Unaccompanied Children in the Immigration System in the United States, 14
U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 311, 347 (2010) [hereinafter Somers, Constructions of Childhood]; WOMEN’S
REFUGEE COMM’N, & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, HALFWAY HOME: UNACCOMPANIED
CHILDREN
IN
IMMIGRATION
CUSTODY
7
(2009),
available
at
http://
womensrefugeecommission.org/search?q=Halfway+Home [hereinafter WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N
& ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP]. This is also based on the author’s personal experience and
observation.
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status. Although the Obama administration has made clear that ICE should focus
its efforts on violent offenders,3 in reality ICE targets any non-citizen who enters
the state juvenile or criminal justice systems, including juveniles charged with
non-violent civil delinquencies such as underage drinking or truancy.4
When a non-citizen child is arrested for a juvenile offense, it has become
common practice for state authorities to contact ICE or allow ICE officers to
question the youth about his or her immigration status. If ICE determines that
the child does not have lawful status, it issues a detainer against the child. As a
result, when a child is ready for release from state custody and would normally
return to family, instead that child is taken into federal custody and charged with
being present in the United States without permission.5
Youth are targeted by ICE not because of the underlying delinquency or
criminal offense, but because of their unlawful status.6 ICE does not take into
account decisions made in state proceedings when making its own decisions
about charging immigrant youth and taking them into custody.7 In some cases,
youth are never charged with a juvenile or criminal offense,8 and in other cases
youth are ordered eligible for release to family pending proceedings,9 yet ICE
still places these youth in immigration detention and removal proceedings.
Many youth apprehended internally were brought to the United States by
parents when they were young,10 have U.S. citizen siblings, and have lived in the
United States for years.11 Some do not even know that they are undocumented.12
Others came fleeing harm or were brought to the country as victims of human
3. President Barack Obama, Remarks on Immigration and Border Security in El Paso, Texas
(May 10, 2011) (“We’re focusing our limited resources and people on violent offenders and people
convicted of crimes . . . .”).
4. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, San Francisco at Crossroads Over Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
2009, at A12 (presenting the case of a non-citizen youth who was held in a juvenile facility and faced
deportation for the minor offense of bringing a BB gun to school).
5. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 12–13.
6. See, e.g., McKinley, supra note 4, at A12; see also Editorial, Immigration Bait and Switch, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A22; Mark Scarp, Arizona Bill Shifts Supervision of Illegal Immigrant Juveniles to
Feds, ARIZ. CAP. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2011; Abigail Trillon, Sanctuary Policy Change Harms, S. F. CHRON., Apr.
7, 2009, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-04-07/opinions/17195347_1_probation-officersjuvenile-hall-new-policy.
7. Id.
8. See JAMES C. BACKSTROM AND GARY L. WALKER, THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR IN JUVENILE
JUSTICE: ADVOCACY IN THE COURTROOM AND LEADERSHIP IN THE COMMUNITY, 5–6 (2005), available at
http://
www.co.dakota.mn.us/NR/rdonlyres/0000094a/nkahigkxbxrixmxnjvvvlrmismbxwnmr/RoleProsec
utorAdvocacyCtRmLeadershipCommunity122005FinalVersion.pdf (“The discretionary decision to
charge or not charge is at the heart of the prosecutorial function.”).
9. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5034 (1988) (“If the juvenile has not been discharged before his initial
appearance before the magistrate, the magistrate shall release the juvenile to his parents, guardian,
custodian, or other responsible party . . . .”); Aryah Somers, Voice, Agency and Vulnerability: the
Immigration of Children through Systems of Protection and Enforcement, in INT’L MIGRATION 10 (Elzbieta
Gozdziak ed., 2010) (explaining that the state court judge ruled that the child should be returned to
family, but she was instead taken into ICE custody) [hereinafter Somers, Voice].
10. See Somers, Voice, supra note 9, at 10; WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 1.
11. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
12. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
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trafficking.13 Yet no matter how benign the reason they came to the attention of
ICE, these children are placed in immigration detention and face deportation,
which may include long-term or even permanent bars to returning to the United
States.14 For many minors, deportation also means extended separation from
parents in the United States, and in some cases return to dangerous conditions.15
A recent case illustrates this trend. Edwin’s parents brought him to the
United States when he was only four years old.16 He grew up in Oregon with his
parents and three U.S. citizen siblings. When Edwin was fifteen years old, he was
arrested for underage drinking, and was then transferred to federal immigration
detention far from his family. From the moment he was detained, Edwin was
adamant that he wanted to remain in the United States so that he could live with
his parents and siblings; however, as months passed in detention, he grew
despondent about his situation. Edwin finally gave up hope and told an
immigration judge that he wanted to be sent back to Mexico rather than remain
in immigration detention. He was granted voluntary departure and was returned
to Mexico straight from custody without ever seeing his family. Edwin had not
lived in Mexico since he was five years old. He had no memories of the country,
spoke only broken Spanish, and ultimately ended up living with a distant family
member whom he had never met.
For a child taken into ICE custody, there are two automatic consequences
that follow from apprehension: placement in immigration detention and
initiation of removal proceedings. Despite these harsh consequences, youth in
removal proceedings have no statutory right to counsel at government expense.17
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that non-citizens have a right to
counsel in removal proceedings “at no expense to the Government” and makes
no exception for youth.18 This means that most youth have a right to counsel only
if they have the ability to pay for legal representation or if a pro bono attorney
agrees to take their case. For children with juvenile delinquency or criminal
history, it is particularly difficult to secure a pro bono attorney and, therefore,
these youth often appear in immigration court pro se.
This article examines the consequences of apprehension for immigrant
youth, like Edwin, who are under eighteen and taken into ICE custody after
coming into contact with state or local law enforcement. The first four parts of
this article explain why court-appointed counsel is needed for this group of
children for whom the current pro bono model of legal representation is failing.
Part I provides an overview of how and why children end up in the immigration
system by way of the criminal and juvenile justice systems. It examines how
youth are targeted by ICE and the legal violations which occur in identifying and
apprehending these youth. Part II describes immigration detention for children.

13. Young & McKenna, supra note 1, at 248; BHABHA & SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 20.
14. INA §212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9) (West 2010).
15. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1484 (2010) (describing the harsh reality of
deportation for individuals as “exile from this country and separation from their families”).
16. All identifying information has been changed to protect confidentiality.
17. INA §§ 240(b)(4)(A), 292, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2006) (individuals in removal
proceedings have a right to counsel but not at government expense).
18. Id.
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Part III explains how youth apprehended internally often spend extended
periods of time trapped between the state and federal custodial and legal
systems. Part IV examines how criminal convictions and juvenile delinquency
adjudications can negatively impact a child’s ability to obtain immigration relief,
resulting in orders of deportation.
Part V argues that the need for counsel also gives rise to a due process right
to counsel at government expense because youth apprehended internally face
multiple deprivations of liberty. It explores the relevant due process
jurisprudence and argues that youth in removal proceedings should be provided
court-appointed counsel pursuant to the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
All individuals in removal proceedings should similarly be granted courtappointed counsel; however, this article focuses on the subset of youth
apprehended internally each year by DHS, their unique vulnerabilities and why
counsel is essential for these children.
I.

FROM JUVENILE DETENTION TO IMMIGRATION DETENTION: HOW CHILDREN ARE
ENSNARED BY ICE ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

An increasing number of children are coming to the attention of
immigration authorities by way of the state juvenile or criminal justice systems.19
This trend is due to efforts in recent years by ICE to target “criminal aliens,”
including youth.20 One of the key components of these enforcement efforts is the
increased cooperation between state and local law enforcement and ICE.21
ICE claims that it focuses internal apprehension efforts on “serious criminal
aliens,”22 however, in practice its programs capture any non-citizen who
interfaces with law enforcement, including youth who are picked up for nonviolent offenses.23 A report issued in October 2009 by Dora Schriro, then-advisor
19. See WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 15;
Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 351.
20. Christopher N. Lasch, Immigration Law: Enforcing the Limits of the Executive Authority to Issue
Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 164–65 (2008); U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL
ALIENS
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/
securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf.
21. Lasch, supra note 20, at 165.
22. See Memorandum from John Morton, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Employees (June 30, 2010), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-reform/pdf/civil_enforcement_priorities.pdf;
U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES, supra note 20, at 1 (explaining that
the Secure Communities initiative “focuses on the identification and removal of aliens who are
convicted of a serious criminal offense and are subject to removal”).
23. A February 22, 2010 memorandum by ICE Director James M. Chapparo was leaked to the
media. The memorandum encouraged efforts to detain and deport more individuals through the
Criminal Alien Program (CAP), including undocumented immigrants with no criminal record.
Memorandum from James M. Chapparo, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to Field
Office Directors and Deputy Field Office Directors, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Feb.
22,
2010),
availalable
at
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/
ICEdocument032710.pdf; see also Julia Preston, Immigration Program is Rejected by Third State, N.Y.
TIMES, June 7, 2011, at A13 (“Official figures from Boston showed that 54 percent of the immigrants
deported under the program had no criminal convictions, only civil immigration violations. Only
about one in four deportees under the program had been convicted of a serious crime, according to
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to Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano, found that these ICE
initiatives have actually only served to increase the number of non-criminal aliens
taken into custody, with no discernible increase in the number of criminal aliens
apprehended.24
Youth in state custody are identified and apprehended by ICE, both
through formal programs like 287(g) and Secure Communities, and also through
informal mechanisms where state police and probation officers share information
with ICE regarding children and allow ICE to question youth in custody.25 At
present, without court-appointed immigration counsel for youth, there is little
accountability for legal violations that occur in the process of state and federal
authorities identifying and detaining immigrant youth.26
A.

ICE’s Formal Programs Which Target Both Adults and Youth

Historically, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) permitted state and
local police to enforce only the criminal provisions of immigration law but not
the civil provisions (e.g., visa violations, unlawful presence).27 The law changed
in 1996, when Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).28 In addition to many provisions aimed at increased
penalties for individuals who are unlawfully in the United States, IIRIRA added
section 287(g) to the INA, empowering certain state and local police officers to
enforce federal immigration laws by entering into agreements with ICE.29
While section 287(g) was largely ignored immediately after its passage, it
gained newfound attention after September 11, 2001, when lawmakers began

the figures.”); Kirk Semple, Cuomo Ends State’s Role in U.S. Immigration Checks, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2011, at A21 (explaining that New York decided to suspend participation in the Secure Communities
program in part because the program was not accomplishing its goal of deporting “serious” criminal
aliens); Editorial, supra note 6, at A22 (“The Immigration and Customs Enforcement Records show
that a vast majority, 79 percent, of people deported under Secure Communities had no criminal
records or had been picked up for low-level offenses like traffic violations and juvenile mischief.”).
24. DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT: IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 12 (2009) (emphasis
added), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-detention-rpt.pdf;
Nina Bernstein, Report Critical of Scope of Immigration Detention, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2009, at A17.
25. See, e.g., Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 351; Somers, Voice, supra note 9, at
10.
26. See INA §§ 240(b)(4)(A), 292, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(4)(A), 1362 (2006).
27. See Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 475 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding the INA does not
prohibit state and local enforcement of criminal immigration provisions); Jay T. Jorgensen, The
Practical Power of State and Local Governments to Enforce Federal Immigration Laws, 1997 BYU L. REV. 899,
919–36 (1997) (describing changes to the INA after the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which allowed state and local enforcement of civil provisions in the INA
as well as criminal provisions).
28. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 28
U.S.C.).
29. INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006); see also Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority
Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited May 28, 2011) [hereinafter Fact
Sheet].
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receiving pressure to assist DHS in the enforcement of immigration laws.30 The
public sentiment that state and local law enforcement should help DHS to
combat terrorism (often conflated with illegal immigration) has caused an
increase in the use of 287(g) agreements.31 While just two agreements existed in
2003, that number increased to approximately seventy-one as of July 2010.32
Between 2006 and 2011, the 287(g) program identified over 185,000 immigrants
in local jails and placed them in removal proceedings.33 Although ICE claims that
287(g) is designed to combat “terrorism and criminal activity,”34 a 2009 report
from the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that 287(g) programs
frequently apprehended individuals after minor violations such as “speeding,
carrying an open container of alcohol, and urinating in public.”35
In August 2007, ICE began its ACCESS initiative (Agreements of
Cooperation in Communities to Enhance Safety and Security) to create more
programs aimed at greater cooperation between state and local law enforcement
and increased interior enforcement.36 In addition to 287(g), the initiative added
the Secure Communities program and the Criminal Alien Program (CAP),
among others.37 Secure Communities, launched in March 2008, aims to identify
non-citizens within the custody of local law enforcement before they are released
from state and local jails.38 In some places, ICE now receives automatic
notification through an integrated records check of both criminal history and
immigration status.39 CAP goes a step further and seeks to secure final removal
orders for “criminal aliens” while they are still incarcerated in federal, state, and
local prisons, so that the individuals are deported after serving their sentences
and are never released back into the community in the United States.40
While the general trend has been an increased use of ICE ACCESS
initiatives throughout the country, New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts all
recently announced that they would no longer participate in the Secure
Communities program because rather than focus on violent offenders, Secure

30. A. ELENA LACAYO, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, THE IMPACT OF SECTION 287(G) OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT ON THE LATINO COMMUNITY 3 (2010), available at http://
www.nclr.org/images/uploads/publications/287gReportFinal.pdf.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 8.
34. Fact Sheet, supra note 29.
35. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED
OVER PROGRAM AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS 11
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09109.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
36. LACAYO, supra note 30, at 4.
37. GAO REPORT, supra note 35, at 11; ICE ACCESS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/access/(last visited May 28, 2011).
38. Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/
secure_communities/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2011).
39. Id. (explaining how in some places, when local police submit fingerprints through FBI
databases for criminal history, those fingerprints are also automatically run in DHS databases to
check immigration status, resulting in automatic notification of ICE).
40. Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://
www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2011).
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Communities more often captures non-criminal aliens and causes families to be
broken apart.41
B.

Informal Mechanisms Used by ICE to Identify Juveniles

In addition to formal programs such as Secure Communities and CAP, ICE
targets youth through informal mechanisms.42 In some locations, probation
officers and others within the juvenile justice system will call ICE to inform them
of immigrant children in custody.43 The child’s information is provided to ICE
without the child’s consent, in breach of the confidentiality protections afforded
to youth in juvenile delinquency proceedings.44 Furthermore, in certain parts of
the country, ICE officers are allowed access to juvenile detention centers where
they question youth about their immigration status.45 In other areas, ICE officers
are stationed at police precincts and local jails, such as Riker’s Island in New
York that holds many juveniles.46
The tactics used by ICE agents interviewing youth are often coercive. ICE
officers will enter juvenile justice facilities in plain clothes, instead of uniforms,
and children are lured into answering the officer’s questions.47 Non-citizen
children in juvenile detention are vulnerable and easily coerced by ICE into
providing information regarding unlawful status.48 In some cases, ICE officers
will fail to inform youth of their Form I-770 Notice of Rights and Disposition, as
required by law.49
Once ICE has determined that a non-citizen child may be removable, ICE
will issue an “ICE-hold” or “detainer” on the child.50 A detainer is a request that
state and local authorities notify ICE when the child is ready to be released from
state custody.51 Although detainers are simply requests for notification, state and

41. Preston, supra note 23, at A13; Semple, supra note 23, at A21.
42. Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 351 (“ICE has broadened its interior
enforcement through 287(g) agreements, work place raids, and informal arrangements with juvenile
justice facilities throughout the country.”).
43. Telephone Interview with M. Aryah Somers, KIND Fellow at The Door (Mar. 4, 2011)
[hereinafter Somers Interview].
44. Id.; Somers, Voice, supra note 9, at 8, 10 (describing two cases—Humberto and Raquel—where
rogue probation officers called ICE to report an undocumented youth in state custody).
45. Somers Interview, supra note 43; Email from Anna R. Welch, Clinical Lecturer and Cooley
Goddard Kronish Fellow, Immigrants’ Rights Clinic, Stanford Law School to Elizabeth Frankel, Staff
Attorney, Immigrant Child Advocacy Project, University of Chicago (Sept. 19, 2010) (on file with
author) (describing these practices in facilities in California: “ICE gains access to children in certain
juvenile halls and interviews them. If the youth admit to certain conduct, ICE then places a detainer
on the child and serves them with a Notice to Appear. Unfortunately, these children are vulnerable
and tend to talk freely to adults without realizing that what they say can seriously harm them.”).
46. Somers Interview, supra note 43; Sam Dolnick, Report Questions the System Used to Flag Rikers
Island Inmates for Deportation, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2010, at A30.
47. Somers Interview, supra note 43.
48. Id.
49. Id; 8 C.F.R. § 1236.3(h) (2011).
50. INA § 287(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2006) and 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2011) (authorizing detainers); see
also Lasch, supra note 20, at 165, 175; BHABHA & SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 93–94.
51. See id.
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local authorities are increasingly willing to cooperate with ICE and enforce ICE
detainers.52
At the point where a U.S. citizen child would be released from state custody
and sent home to family, an increasing number of immigrant children are instead
turned over to the custody of ICE and sent to immigration detention. When a
child is arrested by state or local authorities, a state court may decide that the
child is eligible for release to family at a number of different points after the
initial apprehension. For example, the state may release the child to family
because the youth was never charged, faces only minor charges, is not a flight
risk, poses no threat to the community, paid a bond, served a sentence, was
found not guilty, or had charges against him or her dropped.53 Rather than being
released, a non-citizen child with an ICE detainer will instead be held for 48
hours to give ICE time to take custody of the child.54 While states are not legally
permitted to hold a youth for more than 48 hours under an immigration detainer,
in practice the 48-hour rule is routinely disregarded and children are kept in state
custody for longer periods of time awaiting ICE transfers.55
Court-appointed counsel would enable youth to challenge such illegal
practices, including detention for more than 48 hours under an ICE-hold,
violation of state confidentiality laws for juveniles, and interrogation of youth by
ICE officials without the requisite Form I-770 Notice of Rights and Disposition.
Lawyers could also make arguments that state and local authorities are violating
federal law when they detain youth simply because of unlawful status without a
felony conviction.56

52. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT DIV., COOPERATION OF SCAAP
RECIPIENTS IN THE REMOVAL OF CRIMINAL ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES (2007), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/OJP/a0707/final.pdf; Lasch, supra note 20, at 173–74.
53. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/5-501 (West 2011) (listing factors a court should
consider when deciding whether to detain a juvenile); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-34 (West 2011) (same);
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 256–57 (1984) (holding state statutes which authorize pre-trial
detention to protect the community are constitutional); Flores v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315, 1345–46 (9th
Cir. 1990) (“There are four governmental concerns that the Court has recognized as sufficient to
override this liberty interest and to justify pretrial detention: (1) danger to the community if the
individual were to be released; (2) risk of flight; (3) concern that the detainee might attempt to
influence the tribunal illegitimately, for example, by intimidating witnesses or jurors; and (4) the need
to protect a juvenile from the consequences of his criminal activity as well as to preserve and promote
the welfare of the child.”); BACKSTROM & WALKER, supra note 8, at 6 (describing diversion programs
for low level or first time juvenile offenders who do not pose a threat to the community).
54. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2011).
55. Id.; see also Press Release, MALDEF, MALDEF Files Suit Against La Grange Sheriff’s Office
for Unlawful Detention of Young Mother, (June 14, 2010), http://maldef.org/
news/releases/maldef_files_suit_against_lagrange_06162010 (last visited May 28, 2011) (describing
how ICE held a young mother for more than forty-eight hours after she posted bond because ICE had
issued a detainer on her); Lasch, supra note 20, at 165, 180 (“The tension that arises between state and
federal officials with respect to detainers may be one reason the 48-hour rule is violated in practice.
Where state or local officials and federal immigration officers each have an interest in an alien,
financial interests cause each agency to attempt to divest itself of custody over the alien.”); BHABHA &
SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 94 (“Though interviews by the investigations unit of ICE (or, prior to 2002,
by INS) were meant to take place within 48 hours of detention, in practice children were held for
weeks, and on some occasions months.”).
56. Aryah Somers recently made this argument. Somers Interview, supra note 43. The INA has
been interpreted repeatedly to preempt state and local police power to enforce the civil provisions of
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II. IMMIGRATION DETENTION FOR YOUTH
Once identified and taken into ICE custody, the child is placed in
immigration detention, perhaps one of the harshest consequences for a minor
who comes to the attention of ICE by way of the juvenile justice system. These
youth leave one juvenile detention center only to be transferred to another
detention facility. Although youth are not transferred to immigration custody
because of any underlying offense—but rather because of their unlawful status—
in many cases, the underlying offense will cause youth to be placed in a more
secure (i.e., punitive) immigration facility. This is true even for youth who have
only been charged with a juvenile delinquency or criminal offense that has not
yet been adjudicated.
Unlike a criminal or juvenile delinquency sentence, which is finite,
immigration detention has no set end point. Youth may be released to family or
sponsors, but such decisions are often left entirely to the discretion of the
custodian, ICE or the Office of Refugee Resettlement.57 Unlike judges in the state
juvenile and criminal justice systems, immigration judges rarely review decisions
regarding release of youth from immigration custody.58 For youth with any type
of juvenile or criminal history, release to a sponsor, including a family member,
becomes more difficult and many of these children end up trapped in federal
custody for long periods of time.59
Youth in immigration custody need counsel to argue for step-downs to less
restrictive facilities and to advocate for release from custody. Not only do youth
have a need for counsel based on placement in immigration detention, but they

immigration law. See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Peoria, 722 F.2d 468, 474–75 (9th Cir. 1983) (“[T]he civil
provisions of the [INA] regulating authorized entry, length of stay, residence status, and deportation,
constitute such a pervasive regulatory scheme, as would be consistent with the exclusive federal
power over immigration.”), overruled on other grounds by Hodgers-Durgin v. De la Vina, 199 F.3d 1037
(9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that state and
local police can only enforce the immigration violation of “illegal entry after deportation,” a criminal
offense). The INA only authorizes state and local law enforcement to detain an individual for
violations of immigration law in a narrow set of circumstances, none of which includes the right to
detain a youth simply because of his or her unlawful status—a civil violation—unless the minor has
also been convicted of a felony or the state and local authorities have entered into a 287(g) agreement
with ICE. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(10) (2006); 1252c(a) (2006); 1324(c) (2006); 1357(g) (2006).
57. Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px), ¶ 14 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 17, 1997) (stipulated
settlement
agreement),
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/immigrants/
flores_v_meese_agreement.pdf [hereinafter FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT].
58. There are mechanisms in the Flores Settlement to challenge decisions regarding release or
placement; however, in practice such challenges are brought infrequently. Id. at Exhibit 2(j). This is
also based on the author’s personal experience and observation. In addition, these youth could bring
habeas petitions in federal court to fight their detention; however, such challenges are also rare. See
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001) (holding that habeas jurisdiction was not repealed by the
AEDPDA and IIRIRA and noting that “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing
the legality of Executive detention . . . .”).
59. See Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 348 (“Often these unaccompanied
children spend longer periods of time in facilities that were not designed for long-term
confinement.”). The average length of stay in ORR custody in 2010 was 68 days, an increase from 45
days in 2003; however, some children, particularly those with juvenile delinquency or criminal
adjudications, remain in ORR custody for much longer periods of time, in some instances a year or
more. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
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have a due process right to counsel pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in In
re Gault, which held that individuals are entitled to court-appointed counsel
where they face a clear loss of liberty.60
A.

The History of Immigration Detention for Youth

The law governing the care of immigrant children in federal custody has
evolved substantially in the course of the last 15 years. Prior to the passage of the
Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Immigration and Naturalization Services
(INS)—the former agency with responsibility for immigration enforcement—was
also responsible for the care and custody of unaccompanied children charged
with immigration violations.61 Thus, the same agency responsible for prosecuting
removal cases against unaccompanied immigrant children was also tasked with
caring for those same children, a clear conflict of interest.62
In 1985, a class action lawsuit, Reno v. Flores, was filed challenging the care
and custody of unaccompanied immigrant youth by the INS.63 In 1997, the
parties settled certain issues related to the detention conditions and release of
unaccompanied children.64 The Flores Settlement Agreement (Flores) is now
recognized as setting the standards for the care of children in federal custody,
whether accompanied or unaccompanied.65
The Flores Settlement sets forth the principle that a child shall be placed “in
the least restrictive setting appropriate to the minor’s age and special needs.”66
Flores also provides for the release of unaccompanied children “without
unnecessary delay” to family, an adult guardian willing and able to care for the
child, or to a program willing to take the child.67 However, pursuant to Flores, a
minor should not be released if detention is necessary to ensure that the child
will appear in immigration court or “to ensure the minor’s safety or that of
others.”68
Following the Flores Settlement Agreement another sweeping change with
regard to the care and custody of immigrant children came with the passage of
the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Homeland Security Act transferred care

60. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1967).
61. Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 334; FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra
note 57; AMNESTY INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN IMMIGRATION
DETENTION
(June
2003),
available
at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/refugee/pdfs/children_detention.pdf.
62. Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 337.
63. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 292 (1993).
64. See id.; FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 57.
65. FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 57.
66. Id. at ¶ 11.
67. Id. at ¶ 14.
68. Id. at ¶ 14 (“Where the INS determines that the detention of the minor is not required either
to secure his or her timely appearance before the INS or the immigration court, or to ensure the
minor’s safety or that of others, the INS shall release a minor from its custody without unnecessary
delay . . . .”).
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and custody of “unaccompanied alien children”69 to the Department of Health
and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, Division of
Unaccompanied Children’s Services (ORR DUCS), which, unlike the INS, is not
responsible for the removal of non-citizens.70
The Homeland Security Act also eliminated the INS and created the
Department of Homeland Security.71 Within DHS, ICE is the agency charged
with internal apprehensions; therefore, it is the agency which initially takes
custody of minors released from state or local custody.72
B.

ICE Custody

ICE has been called the “gatekeeper” with regard to the care and custody of
immigrant children apprehended internally because ICE makes the initial
determination about the age of the child and whether he or she should be kept in
ICE custody, released to family or transferred to the Office of Refugee
Resettlement.73 When taken into ICE custody, the child is initially placed in an
ICE-contracted facility—a local city or county jail, a state facility, or a juvenile
detention center.74 ICE is then tasked with making a determination as to whether
the youth is “accompanied” or “unaccompanied,” which affects where that
youth must be placed.
An “unaccompanied alien child” is defined in the Homeland Security Act as
a child who is under eighteen, without legal status, and without a parent or
guardian willing or able to take custody.75 In some cases, the youth may have
family in the United States, but the family members cannot come forward and
claim their child without fear of apprehension by ICE.76 In such cases, the youth

69. “Unaccompanied alien child” is a term defined in section 462(g)(2) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002; however, for purposes of this article, the terms “unaccompanied immigrant child” and
“unaccompanied minor” are used interchangeably with unaccompanied alien child.
70. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462(a), 6 U.S.C. § 279(a) (2006). ORR DUCS’s stated mission
reads: “In accordance with the mission of ORR which is founded on the belief that new arriving
populations have inherent capabilities when given opportunities, ORR/DUCS provides
[unaccompanied alien children (UAC)] client-focused care utilizing a holistic approach to individual
service planning, treating all UAC in its custody with dignity, respect and special concern for their
unique strengths and needs. DUCS considers the best interests of the child in all decisions and actions
relating to the placement of each UAC. DUCS strives to provide the highest quality of care tailored to
each UAC in order to maximize the UAC’s opportunities for success both while in care, and upon
discharge from the program to sponsors in the US or return to home country, to assist them in
becoming
integrated
members
of
our
global
society.”
ORR
Mission,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/unaccompanied_alien_children.htm (last visited
May 12, 2011).
71. Homeland Security Act of 2002 §§ 101, 271, 6 U.S.C. §§ 111, 291 (2006).
72. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 411, 6 U.S.C. § 211 (2006).
73. Nugent, supra note 1, at 219–35; WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 5; Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 351.
74. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 12–13.
75. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462(g)(2), 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (defining “unaccompanied
alien child” as a child who (1) “has no lawful immigration status in the United States”; (2) “has not
yet attained 18 years of age”; and (3) “with respect to whom- (i) there is no parent or legal guardian in
the United States or (ii) there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States who can provide care
and physical custody.”).
76. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 7.
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will be deemed “unaccompanied.”77 ICE is supposed to transfer all
unaccompanied alien children to ORR custody within seventy-two hours;78
however, in practice, ICE will hold some unaccompanied immigrant children—
particularly those with juvenile delinquency or criminal adjudications—for
longer periods of time, even though there is no legal mechanism for ICE to do
so.79
ICE is also tasked with assessing the age of a youth to determine whether
the child is under eighteen and therefore eligible for transfer to ORR.80 When the
age of a youth is in question, ICE will often use dental examinations and
radiograph to assess the child’s age; however, experts have found such methods
wholly unreliable for determining the accurate age of a teenager or young
adult.81 Thus, ICE may mistake a seventeen-year-old for an eighteen-year-old
and transfer the child to adult immigration custody, rather than to ORR.82
If a youth has family willing and able to come forward, that child will not be
deemed an unaccompanied alien child and will not be transferred to ORR—
instead the child is deemed “accompanied.”83 Similarly, children with legal
status (legal permanent residents, refugees, etc.) are not considered
“unaccompanied alien children” because of that status and can, therefore, not be
transferred to ORR.84 In both instances, ICE will at times keep children in
custody even though there are family members willing to come forward.85 This
generally happens when the child has juvenile delinquency or criminal history.86
The Flores Settlement Agreement applies to the care and custody of both
accompanied and unaccompanied youth; therefore, both ICE and ORR
placements must meet the Flores standards. Flores requires that youth in custody
be provided information regarding free legal assistance, educational services five
days a week, individual and group counseling by trained social workers and
recreation time, including daily time outdoors (weather permitting).87 Despite

77. Id.
78. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462, 6 U.S.C. § 279(a) (2006); Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act § 235(b)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1232(b)(3) (West 2008).
79. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 9. This
practice violates the law. The Homeland Security Act makes no exception for children with juvenile
adjudications in its definition of “unaccompanied alien child” and provides for the transfer of care of
all unaccompanied alien children to the Office of Refugee Resettlement. The Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act provides that all such transfers must take place within 72 hours.
There is no exception for children with juvenile delinquency or criminal charges or adjudications.
Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462(a), (g)(2), 6 U.S.C. § 279(a), (g)(2) (2006); Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act § 235(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1232(b)(3) (2008).
80. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 6.
81. Id.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 7; Report on Immigration in the United States: Detention and Due Process, Inter-Am.
Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II, doc. 78/10 ¶ 376 (2010), available at http://cidh.org/pdf%20files/
ReportOnImmigrationInTheUnited%20States-DetentionAndDueProcess.pdf.
84. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
85. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 7.
86. Id.
87. FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 57, at Exhibit 1.
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these requirements, many ICE facilities lack oversight and are in clear violation
of Flores.88
The Women’s Refugee Commission, a non-profit organization, issued a
report in February 2009 on unaccompanied minors in immigration detention.89
The report paints a bleak picture of the conditions for children at ICE facilities.
One ICE-contracted facility is a state juvenile detention center in Berks County,
Pennsylvania:
Children were made to walk on lines marked on the floor, with their hands at
their sides at all times. They were not allowed to look up unless directed to do so.
The children interviewed stated that they were often locked in their single rooms
for up to 22 hours a day. They received only three hours of education per day.
While in their rooms, children were allowed to wear only shorts and a t-shirt;
shoes and pants had to be left outside the door. Children were not allowed
personal belongings and were permitted only one book in their room at any
given time. The rooms each had one long thin window, but they were not
allowed to look out the windows. At the time of our visit, a child was scolded for
doing so.90

The Women’s Refugee Commission asked ICE about legal services for
children and were told that ICE provides children with a list of free legal
providers in the area; however, when contacted by the Women’s Refugee
Commission, it turned out that none of those attorneys had ever provided legal
services to a child in ICE custody and most did not provide services to children
or were not located anywhere near the facility.91 Most advocates working with
immigrant youth do not even know where these ICE facilities are located because
the locations are undisclosed.92 Furthermore, while in ICE custody, youth
generally have no access to services, such as mental health evaluations.93
With court-appointed counsel, youth could challenge determinations by ICE
regarding age, whether a youth is considered accompanied or unaccompanied,
decisions not to release accompanied minors with juvenile delinquency or
criminal history to family, failures to transfer unaccompanied alien children to
ORR within the required 72 hours, violations of Flores and failures to provide
youth with the I-770 Notice of Rights and Disposition.
C.

Custody of the Office of Refugee Resettlement

When a youth is transferred from the state juvenile or criminal justice
systems to ORR, that child will initially be placed in one of three levels of care—
shelter, staff-secure or secure—depending on the severity of the adjudication or

88. Id.; WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 9,
13.
89. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2.
90. Id. at 13.
91. Id.
92. Somers Interview, supra note 43. This is also based on the author’s personal experience and
observation.
93. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 13.
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charges.94 Pursuant to Flores, ORR must place a minor in the least restrictive
setting appropriate to meet the minor’s needs and ensure that the child will not
pose a danger to himself or a danger to the community.95 Flores further provides
that ORR shall consider prior juvenile delinquency or criminal adjudications or
charges, when making such decisions;96 however, ORR generally receives little
information regarding a child’s history, making it difficult for ORR to assess an
appropriate initial placement option.97
ORR uses a two-stage decision-making process and standardized decisionmaking tool, developed by the Vera Institute of Justice, to place youth in the
appropriate level of care.98 ORR reserves its staff-secure and secure placements
for youth with certain types of juvenile delinquency or criminal histories and
youth who have exhibited violence or threats of violence, approximately twelve
percent of the population.99 Some youth with less serious or non-violent juvenile
or criminal history are placed in shelter care.100 ORR generally contracts with
local non-profit organizations which operate the shelter and staff-secure
facilities,101 while it contracts with state juvenile detention centers for a small
number of secure placements.102
Youth in any ORR facility may be stepped-down to a less restrictive
placement or stepped-up to a more restrictive facility, depending on behavior.103
ORR reviews placements of youth in secure facilities on a monthly basis to assess
whether a child is eligible to be stepped-down.104 ORR also has residential
94. Telephone Interview with Susan Shah, Director, Unaccompanied Children’s Program, Vera
Institute of Justice (May 6, 2011) [hereinafter Shah Interview].
95. See FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 57, at ¶ 21.
96. Id.
97. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 6; Shah
Interview, supra note 94.
98. In 2008, ORR requested assistance from the Vera Institute of Justice to improve its placement
decision-making process for all youth referred to ORR to ensure that every child is placed into the
appropriate level of care. Particular attention was paid to youth transferred from state and local law
enforcement. ORR was facing a number of challenges when placing these youth. First, with increased
interior enforcement in recent years, the numbers of youth entering the immigration system by way
of the state juvenile or criminal justice systems had greatly increased, yet ORR had little knowledge
of what happened to youth in the state system. Second, ORR often received limited information
regarding the nature and extent of the child’s prior (or ongoing) involvement with the state justice
systems. In addition, at the time of the pilot, ORR had limited placement options in certain parts of
the country and some of the less restrictive ORR-contracted facilities were unable to admit youth
with any type of juvenile delinquency or criminal history due to state licensing restrictions or
organizational policies. Shah Interview, supra note 94.
99. See Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act § 235(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2) (2006)
(requiring placement of children in the “least restrictive setting that is in the best interest of the
child”); FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 57, at ¶ 21; Shah Interview, supra note 94.
100. Shah Interview, supra note 94.
101. See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN’S SERVICES, SOCIAL
SERVICES FACILITIES, http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/about/divisions.htm (last visited June
15, 2011).
102. See Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 347.
103. FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 57, at ¶ 23.
104. 8 U.S.C. § 1232(c)(2); Memorandum from David H. Siegel, Acting Director, Office of Refugee
Resettlement to ORR/DUCS Staff, ORR/DUCS Field Coordinators, and ORR/DUCS-Funded Secure
Provider Facility Administrators (Apr. 9, 2009) (on file with author).
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treatment centers for youth determined to suffer from mental illness and, after
assessment, youth may be transferred to those facilities as well.105
Unlike ICE which often takes days or even weeks to transfer youth to ORR,
once ORR receives notice of an unaccompanied child in ICE custody, it will work
to place that child in a facility within three hours.106 ORR also regularly inspects
its facilities to make sure that they are in compliance with the provisions of the
Flores Settlement Agreement.107
D.

Youth in Immigration Custody Experience a Loss of Liberty

While ORR has made strides in placing youth in less restrictive settings, the
children in these facilities are still detained and thus experience many of the
hardships associated with confinement. Although immigration detention is
considered “civil”—and the goal of detention is to ensure appearance in court
rather than to punish—many youth experience their time in immigration
detention as punitive. In Gault, the Supreme Court made the important
observation that when a child is “committed to an institution where he may be
restrained of liberty for years,” it does not matter how the institution or facility is
labeled—the child is incarcerated.108 As the Court stated:
It is of no constitutional consequence—and of limited practical meaning—that
the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial School. The fact of
the matter is, however euphemistic the title, a “receiving home” or an “industrial
school” for juveniles is an institution of confinement in which the child is
incarcerated for a greater or lesser time. His world becomes a “building with
whitewashed walls, regimented routine and institutional hours.”109

Immigrant youth in federal custody are similarly confined, and even youth
placed in immigration shelters, rather than juvenile detention centers, may
experience their time in federal custody as punishment.
Youth in shelter, staff-secure and secure facilities all lack freedom to leave
and, in general, movement within the facility is restricted. Youth are usually
unable to attend regular public schools in the community, but rather go to classes
within the detention center.110 Facilities often have many rules which youth are
required to follow and failure to do so can result in a range of consequences.111 In
some secure juvenile detention facilities, isolation from other youth is used as a

105. See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 101.
106. ORR has intake personnel who work twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Shah
Interview, supra note 94.
107. Compare Amnesty Int’l, supra note 61 (describing conditions of detention under the INS), with
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., supra note 83, at ¶ 373 (describing the conditions of detention under ORR).
108. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967); see also Emily Buss, Rethinking the Connection Between
Developmental Science and Juvenile Justice, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 493, 503 (2009).
109. Gault, 387 U.S. at 27 (quoting Holmes’ Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 616 (1954) (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting)).
110. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 25
(“DUCS facilities provide a variety of educational programming; however, the quality of educational
services varies.”).
111. See BHABHA & SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 87.
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punishment.112 Step-down to less restrictive settings or admission into long-term
group homes or foster care is often contingent on sustained good behavior,113
which can be exceptionally hard when the difficulties of being a teenager are
compounded by the challenges of detention and constant scrutiny.
Detention is particularly difficult for minors in more secure immigration
facilities.114 These youth experience many of the same problems as domestic
youth in juvenile detention. As the Women’s Refugee Commission Report
explains,
Some staff-secure and, particularly, secure facilities are, or closely resemble,
juvenile correctional facilities, and are characterized by constant observation
from staff and increased structural security. Even lower security shelters have
begun adding more security, including more cameras and bars on doors and
windows, because it is difficult for staff to monitor the large numbers of children
housed in them.115

When youth in ORR care are placed in state-run juvenile detention centers,
they are subject to all of the rules and restrictions of the facility.116 It is common
for youth in state juvenile detention facilities to be medicated at high rates.117
When immigrant youth are placed at these facilities, they are similarly
medicated.118 For example, the Women’s Refugee Commission Report found that
one secure juvenile detention facility with which ORR contracts, reported that
“more than half of the children were on prescription sleeping pills.”119
The number of beds for children in secure and staff-secure facilities has
increased recently due to a rise in referrals to ORR from ICE.120 Furthermore,
most states do not have facilities for unaccompanied minors; only three states
currently have secure ORR facilities and seven have staff-secure placements.121
As a result, it is common for youth to be transferred out of state and away from
family.122

112. See id.
113. See Memorandum from David H. Siegel, supra note 104, at 2–3. This is also based on the
author’s personal experience and observation.
114. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 18.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 59.
117. Angela Olivia Burton, “They Use it Like Candy”: How the Prescription of Psychotropic Drugs to
State-Involved Children Violates International Law, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 453, 474–75 (2010).
118. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 16.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 15.
121. See OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, supra note 101 (explaining that in total there are ORR
facilities in thirteen different states); DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FISCAL YEAR 2011,
ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES: JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS
COMMITTEE
256
(2010),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/olab/budget/
2011/2011_all.pdf (“The budget request reflects the Administration’s recommendation that DHS
continue to transport UAC from the places they are apprehended to ORR shelters. ORR will make
efforts to increase the proportion of shelter capacity within a 250 mile radius of the border in order to
limit travel time for UAC and better control federal costs by easing the transportation burden on
DHS.”); WOMEN’S COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 54–55 (listing
placements as of 2008).
122. See id. This is also based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
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One of the most challenging aspects of detention for youth is that, unlike a
criminal or juvenile delinquency sentence, immigration detention has no definite
duration. Thus, children can spend anywhere from a few months to over a year
in immigration detention.123 Furthermore, the youth are facing deportation. The
uncertainty about when they will be released and whether they will be allowed
to remain in the United States can be highly stressful and even traumatic.124
It is widely recognized that detention is an independent risk factor in the
development of mental illness.125 It is common for a child’s mental health to
deteriorate while in custody.126 Detained children may develop “apathy,
depression, and feelings of hopelessness and worthlessness.”127 Children may
engage in self-harm while in detention.128 Furthermore, many youth who commit
criminal offenses already suffer from some type of mental illness and then end
up in detention facilities which can exacerbate the problem.129
E.

Pro bono Model of Legal Representation for Youth in ORR Custody

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 called for the Director of the Office of
Refugee Resettlement to develop “a plan to be submitted to Congress on how to
ensure that qualified and independent legal counsel is timely appointed to
represent the interests of each [unaccompanied alien] child” in custody.130 In

123. While most children are reunified with family or placed in foster care within a few months,
some children spend many months or even years in the custody of ORR. See BHABHA & SCHMIDT,
supra note 1, at 86.
124. See Louise K. Newman & Zachary Steel, The Child Asylum Seeker: Psychological and
Developmental Impact of Immigration Detention, 17 CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM.
663, 680 (2008) (explaining the current stressors for detained children include “being held indefinitely
in detention, being subject to incomprehensible legal and administrative processes and having little
control over daily life.”); HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, IN LIBERTY’S SHADOW: U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM
SEEKERS IN THE ERA OF HOMELAND SECURITY 34 (2004), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wpcontent/uploads/pdf/Libertys_Shadow.pdf (describing that for detained asylum seekers “the length
of time in jail and uncertainty of duration contributed to the deterioration of mental health”).
125. See Newman & Steel, supra note 124, at 670; OFFICE OF THE CHILD ADVOCATE REPORT,
JUVENILE DETENTION CENTER INVESTIGATION: AN EXAMINATION OF CONDITIONS OF CARE FOR YOUTH
WITH MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS (2004), available at http://www.state.nj.us/childadvocate/
publications/PDFs/1FINAL_JJ_Mental_Health_Exec_Sum.pdf (“Confinement exacerbates serious
mental health disorder, but in most instances county detention centers are ill-equipped to discern and
meet the mental and behavioral health needs of all admitted youth.”).
126. BHABHA & SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 87.
127. Id. (“When such vulnerable youth are held in a secure non-therapeutic environment and do
not receive adequate, ongoing mental health care, the damage to that youth’s psychological
functioning can be immense.”); Newman & Steel, supra note 124, at 670 (“Depression has been the
most common mental disorder described in detainee populations and seems to become more severe
with increasing length of time in detention.”).
128. See Cristina M. Gaudio, A Call to Congress to Give Back the Future: End the “War on Drugs” and
Encourage States to Reconstruct the Juvenile Justice System, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 212, 216 (2010) (“[T]he
conditions of confinement make incarcerated teens more susceptible to depression, stress-related
illnesses, suicide and self-harm.”)
129. Elizabeth Calvin, National Juvenile Defender Center, Legal Strategies to Reduce the Unnecessary
Detention of Children, 73 (2004) (“A high percentage of youth in the juvenile justice system have a
diagnosable mental health disorder. . . . It is safe to estimate that at least one out of every five youth
in the juvenile justice system has serious mental health problems.”).
130. Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462(b)(1)(A), 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A) (2006).
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2005, ORR launched a pilot project to fund legal service providers who would
facilitate a pro bono model of legal representation for youth in ORR custody.131
Through this project, ORR currently funds legal service providers to screen the
children in ORR custody for legal relief and to provide “Know Your Rights”
presentations to educate the children about their legal rights.132 However, at
present, these legal service providers are not allowed to offer direct legal
representation with government funds.133 As a result, the model relies on the
legal service providers locating pro bono counsel—either staff at subcontracted
facilities using non-government funding or private volunteer attorneys—to
represent minors identified as eligible for legal relief.134
The creation of this pro bono model of representation is due to the prevailing
view of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that the government is prohibited from
paying for direct legal representation for non-citizens in removal proceedings.135
Most advocates, and a growing number of government officials, disagree with
this reading of the law and believe that the INA does not require the government
to provide counsel, but also does not preclude the government from voluntarily
doing so.136 Nonetheless, DOJ’s view of the law has resulted in the creation of the
current pro bono model of legal representation.
While the pro bono model has facilitated the legal representation of many
youth, it is often difficult to find pro bono attorneys willing to take the cases of
youth with juvenile delinquency or criminal charges or adjudications. These
cases are more complicated and often more challenging to win given the
potential immigration consequences resulting from the delinquency adjudication
or criminal conviction. In addition, the clients themselves may not be seen as
sympathetic, given their alleged past criminal conduct. Because the legal service
providers do not have the resources to match every child in immigration custody
with a pro bono attorney, they will generally prioritize cases where the child has a
greater likelihood of success. In some areas where many immigrant families
reside, there is a six month wait to be assigned a pro bono attorney, and some
cases simply cannot be placed.137 Youth with juvenile delinquency or criminal
history frequently fail to get placed with pro bono counsel.138
Youth apprehended internally need attorneys to argue for release from
custody or for step-down to less secure settings. The Flores Settlement Agreement
provides a mechanism to challenge placement and release determinations, yet

131. See Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 366–67.
132. Id.
133. Id. Many organizations raise some private funding in order to provide direct representation
on a small number of cases; however, the number of cases they can take is generally very limited.
134. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROMOTING JUSTICE IN THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: LEGAL ACCESS
FOR UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN (July 2009), http://www.vera.org/download?file=2882/2009-0803_DUCS_summary.pdf.
135. See id.
136. Id; Letter from David Martin, Principal Deputy Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas J. Perrelli, Assoc. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 10, 2010) (on file with author).
137. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
138. See WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 23.
This is also based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
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such challenges are rare.139 This leaves discretion largely vested in immigration
officials, rather than judges. Without attorneys advocating for release, some
youth end up spending longer periods of time in detention and eventually give
up on legal claims and seek removal simply to get out of custody.140 Such cases
present serious concerns about what will happen to those children upon return
to their country of origin and whether they will attempt the dangerous journey
back to the United States.
III. YOUTH TRAPPED BETWEEN COMPETING STATE AND FEDERAL SYSTEMS
Unaccompanied children apprehended internally face a number of unique
challenges based on their involvement in both the state and federal custodial and
legal systems. While state and local officers cooperate with ICE to transfer youth
to immigration custody, once the child is in federal custody, the communication
and cooperation generally stops.141 Youth frequently end up trapped in a
revolving door between the state and federal systems, unable to access many of
the benefits and protections afforded by either system.142
The competing state and federal systems often operate at odds with one
another. As a result, youth spend extended periods of time in both state and
federal detention. Furthermore, many of the protections afforded to youth in the
state juvenile justice system are wholly lacking—and even undermined—in
removal proceedings. Once again counsel is imperative to help ensure some
basic protections for these children.
A.

Competing Custodial Systems

The state and federal custodial systems often function at cross-purposes.
The federal immigration system does not take into account time already spent in
state juvenile detention. A state court decision to release a youth to family or
elsewhere has no effect on ICE.143 If ICE has placed a detainer on a child, that
minor will be taken into custody.144 Youth who have already served sentences in

139. Specifically, pursuant to Flores, “A minor in deportation proceedings shall be afforded a
bond redetermination hearing before an immigration judge in every case, unless the minor indicates
on the Notice of Custody Determination that he or she refuses such a hearing.” FLORES SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT, supra note 57, at ¶ 24.A. Flores further provides that a youth who disagrees with the
“determination to place that minor in a particular type of facility” or who asserts the facility does not
comply with the requisite standards, “may seek judicial review in any United States District Court
with jurisdiction and venue over the matter.” FLORES SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, supra note 57, at ¶
24.B.
140. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 23
(“[A]lthough many children are fleeing conflict and abuse in their home country, and have legitimate
claims to protection in the United States, many become frustrated by the legal process and ultimately
accept deportation even if they previously expressed a fear of return.”).
141. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
142. See, e.g., Somers, Voice, supra note 9.
143. See id., at 8–10 (describing cases of Humberto and Raquel, where a state court judge ordered
the child to be released to family or a group home, but ICE still took the child into immigration
custody).
144. See id; 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2011).
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the state system may subsequently end up being held in immigration custody for
two or three times as long as they spent serving their original sentences.145
Furthermore, due to limited placement options, immigration authorities will
transfer youth out of state, even if the minor has a pending criminal or juvenile
delinquency case.146 State court judges are often not informed when a child has
been transferred to the custody of ICE,147 which can result in the issuance of a
warrant or default order by the state court against the youth for failure to
appear.148 In such cases, when the child is released from immigration custody, he
or she may be picked up again by state authorities.149 Youth in federal custody
are also unable to comply with probation requirements, resulting in the children
being taken back into state custody for probation violations upon release from
immigration detention.150
Even in cases where the state or juvenile court judge is informed that the
child has been placed in immigration detention, and the judge stays proceedings
until the child is released, that youth may still be taken back into state custody to
serve a sentence once the criminal or juvenile delinquency case is adjudicated.151
Youth may spend anywhere from months to years in federal and state custody.152
Yet while in federal custody, many youth are unable to access certain benefits
available through the state legal and custodial systems. For example, in order to
be granted Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, the child must first obtain an order
from a state court finding that the child was abused, abandoned or neglected by
one or both parents and it is not in the child’s best interests to be returned to his
or her country.153 However, in some states, youth in federal custody are unable to
get into state court to obtain the requisite order, either because they need an
adult to petition for them (and the child’s family lives in another state) or
because the state court will not declare a youth in federal custody a dependent
on the state.154 If a child cannot get released from custody before turning
145. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
146. At present, most states do not have short-term facilities for unaccompanied alien children in
ORR care. Many of these beds are located along the border in Texas. See WOMEN’S COMM’N & ORRICK
HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 14, 54.
147. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
148. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-12-70 (1975); ARIZ. JUV. CT. R. P. 23(E); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §
256.5 (West 2008); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 312.2 (McKinney 2008).
149. See id.
150. See Somers, Voice, supra note 9, at 8–10 (describing the stories of children where probation
officers called ICE so the children were taken into ICE custody and were unable to comply with state
court orders and probation requirements).
151. See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-501 (2009) (listing factors a court should consider when
deciding whether to detain a juvenile); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:4A-34, -43 (West 2006) (same).
152. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
153. INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (West 2010); Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act § 235(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (2008).
154. Some states require that a custodian petition the court; yet in many cases family members are
not located in the same state as the immigration facility and the federal government—the legal
custodian—will not petition a state court for such an order as a matter of practice. See, e.g., N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 9:2-9 (West 2010); FAM. CT. ACT § 661 (McKinney 2011). In other states, the courts will not
entertain a dependency petition while the child is still in federal custody. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:2-9 (“[T]here is no other person, legal guardian or agency exercising custody over such child . . . .”)
This is generally because the state courts believe that such a child does not need to be declared a
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eighteen, he or she may lose the opportunity to apply for Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status because many state laws will not grant the requisite dependency
or predicate order after the child turns eighteen.155
Youth in the federal immigration system have also at times been barred
from entering the state foster care system. The states generally view immigrant
children as the responsibility of the federal government and will not admit these
youth into state care, usually out of concern for the cost of caring for them.156 In
other cases state child welfare authorities have repatriated non-citizen youth
who come into custody.157
There is a federal foster care system that is part of the Unaccompanied
Refugee Minors (URM) Program.158 The URM program will admit
unaccompanied immigrant children as long as those children qualify for some
type of legal relief.159 However, because space within the URM program is
limited, many immigrant youth—particularly those with juvenile delinquency or
criminal backgrounds—are not admitted into this program.160
Counsel can provide a critical role in assisting youth in release from this
cycle of custody and bridging the gap between the state and federal systems.
Counsel can advocate with state court judges not to issue warrants for failure to
appear, with immigration authorities to bring youth to state court if necessary,
with state judges and probation officers to give youth credit for time served in
the federal system and ultimately, with ICE or ORR for release from federal
custody.161 Attorneys can also advocate that youth be placed in foster care when
they have nowhere else to go.
B.

Legal Systems at Odds

Like the state and federal custodial systems, the juvenile delinquency and
immigration legal systems similarly operate at odds with each other. The
juvenile delinquency system was initially developed with the goals of
rehabilitation and reintegration, based on the recognition that youth are less
culpable for conduct and more easily rehabilitated given their stage of

dependent of the state if in federal custody. See id. The problem with this reasoning is that without
the requisite predicate order, these youth cannot obtain a Special Immigrant Juvenile visa and,
therefore, they remain vulnerable to deportation and return to the countries they fled because of
abuse, neglect or abandonment.
155. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8:9 (West 2010) (“Abused child” means a child under the age
of 18 years . . . .”).
156. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
157. Somers, Voice, supra note 9, at 11.
158. See Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 462(b)(3), 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(3) (2006); U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ADMIN. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT,
UNACCOMPANIED
REFUGEE
MINORS,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/programs/
unaccompanied_refugee_minors.htm [hereinafter UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE MINORS].
159. See Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 359; UNACCOMPANIED REFUGEE
MINORS, supra note 158.
160. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
161. While criminal defense attorneys could also assist in making such arguments, some youth
are transferred to immigration custody before being appointed a criminal defense attorney and others
have criminal defense attorneys who are overworked or do not understand the immigration system.
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development.162 Although the juvenile justice system has become highly
punitive,163 the goal of rehabilitation is still the stated purpose under many state
statutes and the protections meant to foster this goal are still in place.164 For
example, in order to promote rehabilitation, children are tried in courts that are
separate from adult criminal courts, juvenile proceedings are confidential,
juvenile records may be sealed, and youth may be given community service or
probation in lieu of serving time in detention.165
By contrast, the immigration system does not recognize children as distinct
from adults.166 Rather, youth in removal proceedings are tried in the same courts
as adults.167 Special Immigrant Juvenile Status is the only form of immigration
relief in the INA which is unique to youth and which statutorily requires
consideration of the best interests of the child.168 For all other forms of relief, a
minor must make the same showing as an adult, and the judge is not required by
the INA to consider what is in the best interests of the child.169
162. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21–27 (1967) (listing the “claimed benefits” of the juvenile justice
system as rehabilitation, less stigmatization, greater protections from later disclosure of juvenile
conduct and more informal court proceedings); Buss, supra note 108, at 500 (“The progressive vision
inspired the creation of separate juvenile courts to shield youthful offenders from the harsh treatment
of the criminal system to which they had been subject in the past, and the new courts aimed to
oversee these offenders’ correction, helping them to grow into productive and law-abiding adults.”);
Kim Taylor-Thompson, Symposium: Children, Crime, and Consequences: Juvenile Justice in America, 14
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 143, 145–47 (describing the historical development of a separate juvenile justice
system).
163. See Katayoon Majd, Students of the Mass Incarceration Nation, 54 HOW. L.J. 343, 356–58 (2011)
(“[A]s the criminal justice system has become more punitive, the juvenile justice system has
responded to youth behavior with increasingly harsher and less rehabilitative responses.”)
164. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301(b)(2) (West 2011) (“This chapter shall be interpreted
and construed to effectuate the following purposes . . . [c]onsistent with the protection of the public
interest, to provide for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision, care and
rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of
accountability for offenses committed and the development of competencies to enable children to
become responsible and productive members of the community.”); Wayne R. LaFave, 1 SUBST. CRIM.
L. § 1.7 (2d ed. 2010) (“The typical juvenile delinquency statute indicates more or less specifically that
juvenile delinquency proceedings are designed not for the punishment of the offender but for the
salvation of the child.”)
165. See, e.g., Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5037, 5038(c), (e) (2006) (describing
options for disposition in juvenile delinquency proceedings and requirements that records and
juvenile’s identity remain confidential); Directors of the Columbia Law Review Ass’n, Rights and
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281 (1967).
166. See Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 372 (“Overall, the basic normative and
legal substantive framework for unaccompanied children in removal proceedings is based upon an
adult framework and does not incorporate a child-oriented framework, such as that expressed in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.”); WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 22 (“Immigration law provides almost no carve-out protections or
special standards for children.”)
167. See BHABHA & SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 149.
168. INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (West 2010); Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act § 235(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1232(d) (2008).
169. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 10 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 337 (2008) (providing a comprehensive history of the
evolution of the best interests of the child standard in U.S. law). Pursuant to international law, all
government officials rendering decisions regarding children must consider what is in the best
interests of the child, but this argument has not been broadly accepted by U.S. immigration judges,
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Similarly, immigration judges, unlike state juvenile court judges, lack
sufficient discretion to fashion relief for children in a manner designed to meet
the child’s needs.170 Thus, at present, if a child does not qualify for legal relief,
but it is not safe for the child to be returned to his or her home country, an
immigration judge has two options: (1) order the child removed anyway or (2)
terminate proceedings, which means that the child will not be deported but will
also not be granted legal relief.171 The second option is seldom exercised. In those
rare cases in which the judge does terminate proceedings, the child is left in a
state of limbo, without legal status.172 Unlike juvenile court judges who routinely
exercise discretion to order a wide array of judgments, including orders
requiring community service or probation in lieu of detention, immigration
judges are limited by statute with respect to the types of relief they may issue in
lieu of deportation.173
Not only do immigrant youth in removal proceedings lack fundamental
protections available to youth in the juvenile delinquency system, but the
removal process undermines many of the protections afforded by the state
juvenile justice system. For example, although juvenile delinquency court
records are supposed to remain confidential—a mechanism intended to promote
rehabilitation and prevent juvenile delinquency proceedings from being used
against the child in the future—such records are often used against the youth in
immigration proceedings.174 In immigration court, the information underlying a
child’s juvenile delinquency case is often shared by police and probation officers
with immigration enforcement officials, and immigration courts will admit
juvenile records as evidence in an immigration case.175 Additionally, because
immigration consequences are often triggered by conduct alone, as further
discussed in the next section, youth are frequently forced to disclose the conduct
underlying sealed juvenile court records.176
In this context, counsel for youth in immigration proceedings becomes
extremely important because counsel can advocate that judges recognize the

most of whom do not have a background in juvenile adjudications nor any training in best interests
standards or customary international law. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989,
art. 3, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005) (every country in the world, except
for the United States and Somalia, has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child).
170. Compare WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2,
at 22 (“Children are subject to the same evidentiary and prosecutorial standards as adults in
immigration proceedings.”), with, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-43 (West 2006) (listing alternative
dispositions available to juvenile court judges).
171. See Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 373.
172. See id. (“While termination is the appropriate outcome for unaccompanied children who
have suffered a violation of due process, the termination does not result in legal status.”)
173. See id. at 373–78.
174. Immigrant Legal Resource Center, Questions and Answers: Immigration Consequences of
Delinquency,
available
at
http://files.illinoislegaladvocate.org/uploads/
7786Q%20%20A%20on%20Imm%20Consequences%20of%20Delinquency1-3.pdf.
175. Id. (“[D]ue to immigration enforcement efforts in the juvenile justice system, probation and
other juvenile justice officials are turning over court records and other information over [sic] to
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which may be used in deportation proceedings. This
sharing of information, however, may violate state confidentiality laws . . . .”).
176. See infra Part IV.B.
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unique vulnerabilities of children. When deciding whether to order a minor
removed, judges should be encouraged to consider age and evidence of
rehabilitation as positive discretionary factors in granting relief. Furthermore,
counsel can highlight when a deportation means return to a country where the
child may have no adult caregiver and faces homelessness or exposure to severe
harm. Our immigration system should afford greater protection to immigrant
youth and should, at a minimum, provide these children with counsel.
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS AND CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
ON THE ABILITY OF YOUTH TO OBTAIN IMMIGRATION RELIEF
Once a youth is identified by ICE as lacking lawful status, that child is
placed in removal proceedings and must defend himself or herself in
immigration court.177 A criminal conviction or juvenile delinquency adjudication
can make it much more difficult for a youth to obtain a visa or other legal status
in order to remain in the United States.178
In March 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Padilla
v. Kentucky, which held that criminal defense attorneys have an affirmative
obligation to advise clients of the immigration consequences attendant to a guilty
plea.179 This decision marked a sea change in the law, which previously held that
criminal defense attorneys had no such obligation.180 In reaching its decision, the
Court recognized the importance of providing legal advice regarding
deportation, given that deportation is a “severe penalty” where individuals “face
possible exile from this country and separation from their families.”181
Padilla further recognized the “intimate” connection between removal
proceedings and the criminal process and explained that it is “most difficult to
divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.”182 The Court
acknowledged that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the most

177. INA §§ 239, 240, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229, 1229a (2006); Nugent, supra note 1, at 222.
178. The types of legal relief available include (1) Asylum, INA § 208, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1158 (West
2008); (2) Special Immigrant Juvenile Status, INA § 101(a)(27)(J), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (West
2010); (3) T visas for victims of human trafficking, INA § 101(a)(15)(T)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)
(West 2010); (4) U visas for victims of crimes in the United States, INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1101(a)(15)(U) (West 2010); (5) relief under the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) for victims of
domestic violence committed by a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, INA §§ 204(a)(1)(A)(iv),
(a)(1)(B)(iii), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(1)(B)(iii) (2006); (6) family-based forms of relief if the
youth has relative who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident; INA §§ 201(b)(2)(A)(i),
203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (West 2009); 1153(a)(2) (2006); and (7) cancellation of removal,
INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2006).
179. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 1487 (2010).
180. See, e.g., Jules v. Fla. Dep’t of Corrections, 313 Fed. App’x. 269, 273 (11th Cir. 2009); SantosSanchez v. United States, 548 F.3d 327, 334 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ramirez-Nino, 288 Fed.
App’x. 543, 545 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Fry, 322 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003) (“All other
circuits to address the question have concluded that ‘deportation is a collateral consequence of the
criminal process and hence the failure to advise does not amount to ineffective assistance of
counsel.’”) (quoting United States v. Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993)).
181. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481, 1484.
182. Id. at 1481.
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important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants
who plead guilty to specified crimes.”183
Despite this recognition of the importance of legal advice regarding
deportation, most youth transferred from state custody remain unrepresented in
immigration proceedings thus undermining the protections of Padilla, because
without counsel, these youth cannot defend themselves and will most likely end
up being deported. The intersection of immigration law and criminal law is
complex,184 and requires a skilled attorney who can make arguments about why
the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability are not triggered under the INA,
why judges should exercise discretion and grant immigration relief, and why
proceedings should be terminated based on violations of due process or because
it would be unsafe for a youth to be repatriated.
A.

Grounds of Deportability and Inadmissibility

The INA lists a wide range of offenses that qualify as either grounds of
inadmissibility or grounds of deportability.185 The grounds of inadmissibility—
set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)—apply to immigrants who were never lawfully
admitted into the United States.186 An individual is considered lawfully admitted
if he or she gained entry into the United States after inspection at a port of entry,
such as a border or an airport.187 An individual is not considered lawfully
admitted if he or she came into the country without presenting himself or herself
to an immigration officer.188
Most unaccompanied immigrant children who come into ORR care—even
by way of the juvenile or criminal justice systems—were never lawfully admitted
into the United States and are subject to the grounds of inadmissibility.189 The
term “inadmissibility” is in some respects a misnomer, since many of the
individuals affected by these grounds are already in the United States.190 If a
youth is convicted of an offense listed as a ground of inadmissibility, the youth
will be unable to apply for certain types of legal relief or to become a lawful
permanent resident, unless the youth qualifies for a waiver.191
The grounds of deportability—set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)—apply to
immigrants who were lawfully admitted to the United States at some point in the

183. Id. at 1480.
184. Id. at 1483 (recognizing that immigration law “can be complex” and determining the
immigration consequences of a criminal plea may not be straightforward); O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d
1307, 1312–13 (9th Cir. 1988) (equating immigration law with the Internal Revenue Code in its
complexity).
185. INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a) (West 2008) (grounds of deportability); INA § 212(a), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West 2010) (grounds of inadmissibility); see also KATHERINE BRADY, IMMIGRANT
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER, QUICK REFERENCE CHART AND NOTES FOR DETERMINING IMMIGRATION
CONSEQUENCES OF SELECTED CALIFORNIA OFFENSES § N.1 (Feb. 2010), http://www.ilrc.org/
files/cal_chart_2.10.pdf.
186. Id.
187. INA § 101(a)(13), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13) (West 2010).
188. See id.
189. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
190. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(13).
191. INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West 2010).
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past. Thus, any child who is a lawful permanent resident or has other lawful
immigration status, such as a student visa or asylum, would be subject to the
grounds of deportability.192 If a youth entered the country on a student visa and
subsequently let that visa expire, that youth would be deportable. Similarly, if a
child enters the country without admission, but is subsequently granted some
type of legal status—like asylum—that youth is deemed “admitted” and would
be subject to the grounds of deportability. If these youth seek to adjust their
immigration status, they will also have to demonstrate that they are admissible
(i.e. not subject to the grounds of inadmissibility). A conviction for a crime that is
a ground of deportability will render such an individual automatically
deportable with few waivers.
There are myriad immigration consequences that may flow from a criminal
conviction or juvenile delinquency adjudication, and those consequences depend
in large part on the type of adjudication or conviction the child receives.193 The
most severe immigration consequences flow from a criminal conviction,194 which
triggers many of the grounds of deportability or inadmissibility under the
INA.195 The grounds of deportability and admissibility may also be triggered by
convictions either in the United States or abroad,196 as well as for uncharged foreign
or domestic conduct.197
If a youth is charged as an adult and convicted of a crime, the youth faces
the same immigration consequences as any non-citizen adult.198 It is not always
clear whether a ground of deportability or inadmissibility has been triggered
and, hence, an attorney is needed to make arguments as to why these grounds do
192. See Brady, supra note 185, at N-10.
193. See INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a) (West 2008); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a); In re Devison, 22 I. &
N. Dec. 1362, 1370 (B.I.A. 2000) (standard for determining whether an adjudication should be
considered a juvenile delinquency adjudication or a criminal conviction is how the conduct would be
treated under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031–5042 (West 2010)).
194. “The term ‘conviction’ means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien
entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where-(i) a judge or jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and
(ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien's liberty to be
imposed.” INA § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(48)(A).
195. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a).
196. See, e.g., In re De La Nues, 18 I & N Dec. 140 (B.I.A. 1981).
197. Almost all applications for immigration relief require the disclosure of all past criminal
conduct, even if the youth was never charged or the conduct happened abroad. See, e.g., Dep’t of
Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Form I-485, Application to Register
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-485.pdf
(“Have you EVER...[i]llicitly trafficked in any controlled substance, or knowingly assisted, abetted, or
colluded in the illicit trafficking of any controlled substance?”) (emphasis in original); Dep’t of
Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Form 1-589, Application for Asylum
and for Withholding of Removal, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-589.pdf (“Have
you or any member of your family included in the application ever committed any crime and/or
been arrested, charged, convicted, or sentenced for any crimes in the United States?”); Dep’t of
Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Form I-914, Application for T
Nonimmigrant Status, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-914.pdf (“Have you
EVER...[c]ommitted a crime or offense for which you have not been arrested?”) (emphasis in
original).
198. See In re Devison, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362, 1370 (B.I.A. 2000).
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not apply.199 However, if a judge determines that a ground of inadmissibility or
deportability has been triggered, deportation is mandatory unless the individual
qualifies for a waiver,200 and judges lack the ability to mitigate the harsh
consequence of deportation.201
A juvenile delinquency adjudication is not considered a “criminal
conviction” for purposes of triggering the conviction-based grounds of
deportability or inadmissibility under the INA.202 This means that a youth who
receives a juvenile delinquency adjudication will not be subject to the mandatory
conviction-based grounds of removal in the INA. However, there are other
mandatory grounds of inadmissibility and deportability that can be triggered by
juvenile delinquency adjudications. Although Padilla does not address juvenile
delinquency proceedings, most advocates believe that the reasoning of Padilla
applies equally to youth who face immigration consequences based on juvenile
delinquency pleas or adjudications.203
B.

Immigration Consequences of Juvenile Delinquency Adjudications

In Matter of Devison, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) held that
“juvenile delinquency proceedings are not criminal proceedings, that acts of
juvenile delinquency are not crimes, and that findings of juvenile delinquency
are not convictions for immigration purposes.”204 Yet some of the grounds of
inadmissibility and deportability are triggered by bad acts or conduct alone,
meaning that no criminal conviction is necessary,205 and juvenile delinquency

199. See INA § 237(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a) (West 2008); INA § 212(a), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (West
2010) (listing complex and varied grounds of deportability); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483
(2010) (“There will, however, undoubtedly be numerous situations in which the deportation
consequences of a particular plea are unclear or uncertain.”)
200. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii), (a)(1)(H)(ii), (a)(2)(vi), (a)(3)(C)(ii), (c) (describing
authorized waivers).
201. See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a) (“Any alien (including an alien crewman) in and admitted to the
United States shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be removed if the alien is within one or
more of the following classes of deportable aliens . . . .”); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a) (“Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, aliens who are inadmissible under the following paragraphs are ineligible to
receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States . . . .”)
202. Devison, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1370; In re Seda, 17 I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (B.I.A. 1980) (establishing
that admitting to a juvenile delinquency offense is not considered an admission of a criminal
conviction under the INA), overruled on other grounds by In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 (B.I.A.
1988).
203. ANGIE JUNCK, SALLY KINOSHITA & KATHERINE BRADY, IMMIGR. LEGAL RESOURCE CTR.,
IMMIGRATION BENCHBOOK FOR JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES 72 (July 2010), http://
www.ilrc.org/files/2010_sijs_benchbook.pdf.
204. Devison, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1365 (explaining that delinquency is civil, not criminal in nature,
delinquency does not result in punishment, and the applicable due process standard for delinquency
is fundamental fairness).
205. See, e.g., INA § 212(a)(2)(C), (H), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(C), (H) (West 2010) (drug trafficking);
INA § 237(a)(2)(F), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(F) (West 2008) (same); INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(1)(A)(iv) (West 2010) (drug addict or abuser); INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2008) (same); INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(D) (West 2010)
(prostitution); INA § 237(a)(3)(D), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(3)(D) (West 2008) (false claims of citizenship);
INA § 237(a)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(E) (West 2008) (alien smuggling).
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charges and adjudications can serve as evidence of the underlying conduct.206
Therefore, despite the holding in Devison, juvenile delinquency adjudications can
still carry serious consequences for a youth’s ability to obtain immigration
relief.207
A wide array of juvenile delinquency drug offenses will trigger certain
conduct-based grounds of removal. For example, the most common conductbased ground of inadmissibility affecting youth is “drug trafficking.”208 The INA
provides that “[a]ny alien the Attorney General knows or has reason to believe is a
drug trafficker” is inadmissible and deportable.209 The Supreme Court has held
that “drug trafficking” constitutes “some sort of commercial dealing,”210 a broad
definition, and the BIA has held that age is irrelevant when it comes to removal
for drug trafficking.211 A juvenile delinquency adjudication for minor drug
possession or sale has been used as evidence that the youth is involved in “drug
trafficking.”212
A finding that a youth is a “drug trafficker” is a permanent bar to that child
ever obtaining lawful immigration status. There is a waiver if the youth can
qualify for either a T visa (for victims of trafficking) or U visa (for victims of
crime in the United States who assisted law enforcement); however, many youth
do not qualify for these visas and face mandatory deportation.213
Other conduct-based grounds of removal214 include being a “drug addict”
or “drug abuser,”215 “engaging in” prostitution,216 use of false documents or
other fraud offenses related to false claims of U.S. citizenship,217 alien
smuggling,218 certain physical or mental disorders, including mental health
problems where an individual may harm himself or others,219 and violations of
206. See In re Rico, 16 I. & N. Dec. 181, 184 (B.I.A. 1977) (“A criminal conviction is unnecessary to
establish a basis for exclusion under this [drug trafficking] provision [of the INA].”); JUNCK,
KINOSHITA & BRADY, supra note 203, at 72–73.
207. See JUNCK, KINOSHITA & BRADY, supra note 203, at 70–75.
208. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(C); 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(F).
209. Id. (emphasis added).
210. Lopez v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 47, 47 (2006).
211. In re Favela, 16 I. & N. Dec. 753, 754–56 (B.I.A. 1979).
212. See In re Rico, 16 I. & N. Dec. 181, 181 (B.I.A. 1977); JUNCK, KINOSHITA & BRADY, supra note
203, at 115.
213. See INA § 212(d)(13), (14), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d)(13), (14) (West 2010); INA § 237(d)(1), 8
U.S.C.A. § 1227(d)(1) (West 2008).
214. This is not a comprehensive list, but is only meant to provide examples.
215. INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iv), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iv) (West 2010) (listing grounds of
inadmissibility, including any alien “who is determined . . . to be a drug user or addict”); INA §
237(a)(2)(B)(ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2008) (listing grounds of deportability, including
current drug addicts or abusers, or individuals who have been drug abusers or addicts “at any time
after admission” to the United States); 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(g) (2010) (emphasis added) (defining “[d]rug
abuse” as “[t]he non-medical use of a substance listed in section 202 of the Controlled Substances Act
. . . which has not necessarily resulted in physical or psychological dependence”); 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(h)
(emphasis added) (defining “[d]rug addiction” as “use of a substance listed in section 202 of the
Controlled Substances Act . . . which has resulted in physical or psychological dependence”).
216. INA § 212(a)(2)(D), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(D).
217. INA § 237(a)(3), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(3).
218. INA § 237(a)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(1)(E).
219. INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(iii).
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an order of protection.220 A juvenile delinquency adjudication or admission will
trigger these grounds of inadmissibility and deportability.221
For many youth, the underlying offense does not trigger any of the grounds
of inadmissibility or deportability under the INA. However, these youth must
still defend themselves against deportation because of their unlawful presence in
the United States. Even if the grounds of inadmissibility or deportability are not
triggered, a juvenile delinquency adjudication or criminal conviction can still
serve as a basis for denying youth the right to remain in the United States. This is
because all forms of immigration relief are considered a “benefit” and not a
right.222 A judge may always exercise discretion and deny that benefit, even if a
child makes a showing that he or she qualifies for asylum, Special Immigrant
Juvenile Status, or even voluntary departure.223
There is no clear test governing whether a juvenile delinquency
adjudication or criminal conduct committed as a juvenile will result in a
discretionary denial of immigration relief. The BIA has held that judges may
weigh negative factors such as past criminal activity—including activity
adjudged to be juvenile delinquency—against positive factors such as evidence
of rehabilitation and good moral character.224 The BIA does not assign a weight
to juvenile delinquency or criminal conduct relative to other factors, including
the age of the child.225 As a result, a particular immigration judge or immigration
officer has full discretion when deciding how to weigh a juvenile delinquency
adjudication and whether to grant an immigration benefit. By way of example, in
a well-reported case from 2004, Edgar Chocoy, age sixteen, sought asylum based

220. INA § 237(a)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii).
221. There are two conduct-based grounds of removal that are triggered by an admission to
criminal conduct—either a crime involving moral turpitude or violation of a controlled substance law.
Specifically, the INA provides that an alien is inadmissible who “admits having committed, or . . .
admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements of a crime involving moral turpitude”
or a violation of any controlled substance law. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)
(West 2010). An admission in the context of a juvenile delinquency adjudication—or an admission to
conduct that would be treated as a juvenile delinquency offense—would not trigger these grounds of
deportability or inadmissibility. See In re M-----U-----, 2 I. & N. Dec. 92, 93 (B.I.A. 1944); In re Seda, 17
I. & N. Dec. 550, 554 (B.I.A. 1980), overruled on other grounds by In re Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552
(B.I.A. 1988). Since the BIA has clearly held that acts of juvenile delinquency are not crimes, a youth
cannot admit to having committed a crime in the context of a juvenile delinquency proceeding and,
therefore, would not be subject to these conduct-based grounds of removal based on any admission
in a juvenile delinquency case. In re Devison, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362, 1365 (B.I.A. 2000).
222. INA § 240, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1229a(c)(4) (West 2006) (“An alien applying for relief or protection
from removal has the burden of proof to establish that the alien---(i) satisfies the applicable eligibility
requirements; and (ii) with respect to any form of relief that is granted in the exercise of discretion,
that the alien merits a favorable exercise of discretion.”)
223. Id.; INA § 240B, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(b)(1)(B) (2006) (allowing judge to exercise discretion based
on consideration of good moral character when deciding whether to grant voluntary departure or
order removal).
224. See Wallace v. Gonzalez, 463 F.3d 135, 138–40 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Martinez-Velarde, No.
A099 621 646 – SAL, 2010 WL 2224586, at *1 (B.I.A. 2010); In re Medina, No. A92 061 433, 2008 WL
1924548, at *1 (B.I.A. Mar. 31, 2008); In re Taha el Kherbaoui, No. A98 344 707 – SEAT, 2007 WL
2825138, at *1 (B.I.A. 2007). See also In re Mendez-Moralez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 301–02 (B.I.A. 1996).
225. See Wallace, 463 F.3d at 139 (speculating that a juvenile delinquency adjudication would
weigh less than an adult conviction, but declining to review any weighing of matters by the BIA);
Taha el Kherbaoui, 2007 WL 2825138 at *1 (acknowledging only that age is a mitigating factor).
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on past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution by the Mara
Salvatrucha (MS), a gang in Guatemala.226 The judge concluded that “even
though a juvenile,” Mr. Chocoy was not deserving of asylum because of his past
criminal history—Mr. Chocoy was arrested in the United States for carrying a
loaded weapon and for delivering drugs.227 After losing his application for
asylum, Edgar Chocoy was deported to Guatemala, where he was killed by the
MS only seventeen days after being forcibly removed from the United States.228
In practice, judges look to any type of criminal or juvenile delinquency
adjudication as a basis for denying immigration relief.229 Since so many youth in
immigration proceedings are unrepresented, there is often no one standing with
the child in court to make arguments regarding rehabilitation, good moral
character and other factors that weigh in the child’s favor.230 As a result,
immigration judges will often make the decision to deny immigration relief
based solely on an adjudication or even a police report, without any context as to
what happened and how the youth may be rehabilitated.231
For other youth, the fact that they have been placed in removal proceedings
means that they will likely be deported because they cannot qualify for any legal
relief. Yet for these youth deportation may also mean separation from family in
the United States or return to countries where they face homelessness or physical
harm.
C.

Immigration Consequences for Youth Convicted of Crimes as Adults

It has become increasingly common for states to charge juveniles as adults
in criminal court, rather than through the juvenile delinquency process. In fact,
all states now have provisions that allow youth to be transferred from juvenile to
adult court in certain situations.232 Through the mid-1990s, there was a trend in
many states of lowering the age at which juveniles could be transferred to adult
court and increasing the number of offenses for which youth could be tried as
adults.233 In some states, children as young as ten years old can be transferred to

226. Michele A. Voss, Young and Marked for Death: Expanding the Definition of “Particular Social
Group” in Asylum Law to Include Youth Victims of Gang Persecution, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 235, 235–36 (2005).
227. Id. at 253 n.120.
228. Id. at 236.
229. Wallace, 463 F.3d at 138–40 (allowing the BIA to “consider youthful offender adjudications
when evaluating applications for adjustment of status”); Martinez-Velarde, 2010 WL 2224586 at *1;
Medina, 2008 WL 1924548 at *1; Taha el Kherbaoui, 2007 WL 2825138 at *1; see also Mendez-Moralez, 21 I.
& N. Dec. at 301–02 (listing the existence of a criminal record as an adverse factor to be considered
against positive factors such as rehabilitation and other evidence of good character).
230. See INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006); Nugent, supra note 1, at 222.
231. This is based on the author’s personal experience and observation.
232. Kelly M. Angel, The Regressive Movement: When Juvenile Offenders are Treated as Adults Nobody
Wins, 14 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 125, 125 (2004); Lisa S. Beresford, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles
Can be Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment, 37
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 783, 793 (2000).
233. Angel, supra note 232, at 130.
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adult court.234 In many states, youth can be transferred for a range of non-violent
offenses, including driving under the influence and possession of marijuana.235
A youth who is convicted of a crime in criminal court faces the same
immigration consequences as any non-citizen adult pursuant to the convictionbased grounds of inadmissibility and deportability. While the categories of
offenses that trigger the grounds of either deportability or inadmissibility are
long, there are three main categories of criminal offenses that most commonly
render an individual subject to the conviction-based grounds of deportability or
inadmissibility. They are “aggravated felonies,”236 “controlled substance
offenses,”237 and “crimes involving moral turpitude.”238
If a youth is charged and convicted of a crime as an adult, that youth may
face mandatory deportation—even if the deportation means that the child is
returning to a country with no one to care for him or her. Judges do not consider
the type of evidence normally put forward at a hearing where an adult or child
faces a loss of liberty, such as ties to the community, family, and rehabilitation.
The conviction-based grounds of removal also carry lengthy bars to reentry to
the United States (in some cases lifetime bars), thus making it nearly impossible
for youth who are deported to return lawfully and reunify with family who
remain behind.239 The conviction-based grounds of deportability and
inadmissibility are extremely broad and include a wide array of non-violent
offenses, misdemeanors, and minor drug convictions.

234. Id. at 132.
235. Id. at 142.
236. “Aggravated felony” is a term of art with a unique definition under the INA. INA §
101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(43) (West 2010) (defining “aggravated felony” for immigration
purposes). Convictions for aggravated felonies are a ground of deportability but not inadmissibility.
INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (West 2008). While many aggravated felonies are
violent felonies, there are also many non-felonies—including certain drug offenses and
misdemeanors—that have been held to constitute aggravated felonies. See, e.g., United States v.
Graham, 927 F. Supp. 619, 621 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (misdemeanor sale of marijuana is an aggravated
felony); In re Ponce de Leon, 21 I. & N. Dec. 154, 156 (B.I.A. 1996) (same); United States v. SanchezVillalobos, 412 F.3d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 2005) (misdemeanor conviction for possession of a controlled
substance (codeine) with sentence of only sixty days is an aggravated felony).
237. Most drug offenses carry immigration consequences. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (West 2010); INA § 237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (West 2008); Padilla v.
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (describing how the INA “specifically commands removal for
all controlled substances convictions except for the most trivial of marijuana possession offenses”).
238. A conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude—another term of art—is a ground of
both inadmissibility and deportability. INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (West
2010); INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i), (ii) (West 2008). Crimes involving moral
turpitude are generally defined as “conduct which is inherently base, vile, or depraved and contrary
to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed between persons or society in general . . . an act
which is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong.” In re Franklin, 20 I. & N. Dec. 867, 868
(B.I.A. 1994), aff’d 72 F.3d 571 (8th Cir. 1995); see, e.g., Mojica v. Reno, 970 F. Supp. 130, 137 (E.D.N.Y.
1997) (jumping a subway turnstile); Da Rosa Silva v. INS, 263 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1010–12 (E.D. Pa.
2003) (shoplifting); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 253, 261–66 (2d Cir. 2000) (stealing bus transfers); United
States v. Qadeer, 953 F. Supp. 1570, 1580–81 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (stealing cellular air time); In re Jurado, 24
I. & N. Dec. 29, 33–34 (B.I.A. 2007) (committing misdemeanor retail theft); Montero-Ubri v. INS, 229
F.3d 319, 321 (1st Cir. 2000) (using a fraudulent driver’s license or application).
239. INA § 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(9) (West 2010).

Frankel_cpcxns (Do Not Delete)

12/21/2011 12:44 PM

DETENTION AND DEPORTATION WITH INADEQUATE DUE PROCESS

95

Treating immigrant youth the same as adults under the INA is unduly
harsh, particularly in light of the now widely accepted social science literature
regarding adolescent development. Two recent Supreme Court cases, Graham v.
Florida and Roper v. Simmons, have recognized that there is a fundamental
difference in the brain development of adolescents as compared to adults, and, as
a result, adolescents are less culpable than adults for criminal behavior.240 A third
recent Supreme Court decision, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, similarly recognized that
because of this difference in brain development, adolescents are more
“‘susceptible to . . . outside pressures’ than adults,” resulting in more involuntary
confessions by juveniles.241
In Roper, the Court held that the death penalty as applied to juveniles is
unconstitutional in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. In so holding, the Court relied on the prevailing social
science literature to conclude that there are three primary differences between
juveniles and adults, which render juveniles less culpable.242 First, the Court
recognized that “a lack of maturity and under-developed sense of responsibility
are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered
actions and decisions.”243 Second, juveniles are more susceptible to peer pressure
and other outside negative influences.244 Finally, the Court pointed out that
“[t]he personality traits of juveniles are more transitory, less fixed,”245 thus
making juveniles more capable of change than adults. Because of these
differences, the Court concluded that minors possess a greater likelihood of
reform and that they have a greater right to be “forgiven for failing to escape
negative influences in their whole environment.”246
In Graham v. Florida, the Court went a step further and held that juvenile
sentences to life without parole for a non-homicide offense also violate the
Eighth Amendment.247 In Graham, the Court found that more recent
psychological and social science developments further support the conclusions in
Roper regarding adolescent development, recognizing that “developments in
psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between
juvenile and adult minds.”248

240. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026–27 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569
(2005).
241. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, No. 09-1121, slip. op. at 9, 18 (S. Ct. June 16, 2011) (quoting Roper,
543 U.S. at 569).
242. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569.
243. Id.
244. Id.; see also Tara Parker-Pope, Teenagers, Friends and Bad Decisions, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (Feb. 3,
2011, 2:30 PM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/02/03/teenagers-friends-and-bad-decisions/
(describing a recent study by psychologists at Temple University finding that “teenage peer pressure
has a distinct effect on brain signals involving risk and reward, helping to explain why young people
are more likely to misbehave and take risks when their friends are watching”).
245. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
246. Id.
247. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
248. Id. at 2026.
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Most recently, in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court held that age is
a relevant factor to consider when assessing whether the right to Miranda
warnings—i.e. notice of an individual’s right to remain silent and have counsel
present—is triggered.249 The Miranda warnings are required in circumstances
where a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to
leave an interrogation.250 The Court recognized that because their brains are less
mature than adults, “children will often feel bound to submit to police
questioning when an adult in the same circumstances would feel free to leave.”251
As the Court in J.D.B. explained, “[O]ur history is replete with laws and
judicial recognition that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature
adults.”252 Our immigration laws should similarly take account of adolescent
brain development and should treat children as children. At a minimum, we
should provide youth with court-appointed counsel to help ensure that they are
not unfairly deported to unsafe conditions. With an increasing number of youth
being charged as adults, the immigration consequences attendant to criminal
convictions are affecting a growing number of youth.253
The role of an attorney can be crucial both in cases involving a criminal
conviction and a juvenile delinquency adjudication. If a youth still has criminal
or juvenile delinquency charges pending, an immigration attorney can play a
critical role in advising criminal defense counsel on how to mitigate the harsh
immigration consequences. The determination of whether a certain offense
triggers grounds of removability is jurisdiction-specific and is often subject to
interpretation; therefore, an attorney can make arguments in immigration court
about why a certain conviction does not actually trigger grounds of
inadmissibility or deportability. An attorney can also advocate with DHS and the
court to terminate or administratively close proceedings in cases where there
have been due process violations—such as failure to properly serve the Notice of
Appearance—or where a youth faces return to a country with no one to care for
him or her. Instead, without counsel, many youth end up unfairly and unsafely
deported.
V. THE DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
Padilla places an affirmative obligation on defense counsel to advise youth
in criminal proceedings of the immigration consequences that may result from a
plea.254 However, there is no parallel requirement that counsel be provided to
advise individuals in removal proceedings.255 Therefore, although these youth

249. No. 09-1121, slip. op. at 1, 6 (S. Ct. June 16, 2011).
250. Id. at 7.
251. Id. at 1.
252. Id. at 11 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104, 115–116 (1982)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
253. See WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 15
(describing the increase in staff-secure and secure placements due, in part, to “the growing number of
children referred to DHS from law enforcement”).
254. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
255. INA § 292, 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006).
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face “exile” from the United States and long-term separation from their parents
and family, many have no attorney to represent them in immigration court.256
Instead, youth are expected to navigate the immigration system on their
own. Thus, without an immigration attorney to represent youth in removal
proceedings, the force of Padilla ends once a youth enters immigration custody
because youth without counsel have little chance of obtaining anything other
than an order of removal.257
At one time, children in juvenile delinquency proceedings were similarly
denied the right to counsel at government expense because delinquency
proceedings—like removal proceedings—are considered civil, not criminal.258
However, in 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gault held that youth in juvenile
delinquency proceedings have the right to certain procedural due process
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment, including the right to courtappointed counsel.259 The Court based its decision in large part on the potential
loss of liberty which may result from juvenile delinquency proceedings.260 Gault
thus granted to children in the delinquency system one of the most important
procedural protections available under the Constitution—the right to an attorney
at government expense.261
The Supreme Court has long recognized that non-citizens in immigration
proceedings must be afforded certain due process protections pursuant to the
Fifth Amendment.262 Failure to provide youth with an attorney at government
expense violates these due process protections. First, the rationale applied by the
court in Gault in holding that there is a right to counsel for youth in juvenile
delinquency proceedings should be extended to youth in removal proceedings
who face a clear deprivation of liberty.263 Second, the Court has held that
immigration proceedings must be “fundamentally fair,” a due process protection
that has repeatedly been held to encompass the right to counsel for certain
parties who would otherwise be unable to obtain a fair result.264 Finally, even if

256. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 22–23
(“[A]t least 25 percent of children who remain in DUCS custody throughout their proceedings do not
have an attorney. . . . At least 70 percent of children released from custody to a sponsor do not have
an attorney and must appear before an immigration judge by themselves.”); Catholic Legal
Immigration Network, Inc., http://cliniclegal.org/pro-bono-signup# (last visited June 4, 2011) (“Less
than 20 percent of unaccompanied children are represented in the immigration courts because a child
who cannot afford to hire an attorney is not appointed one.”); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1484.
257. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: SIGNIFICANT VARIATION
EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS AND JUDGES 83 (2008), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08940.pdf (finding that asylum claimants represented by counsel
were more than three times more likely to be granted asylum than those who were unrepresented);
WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 23.
258. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
259. Id. at 41.
260. Id.
261. See id.
262. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 597
(1953) (recognizing that “not even Congress may expel [an alien] without allowing him a fair
opportunity to be heard”).
263. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36–37.
264. See, e.g., Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004).
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this right is assessed under Mathews v. Eldridge—which provides the test for
determining what due process is necessary in civil cases where individuals do
not face a loss of liberty—these youth should still be entitled to court-appointed
counsel.265
While many of the arguments regarding right to counsel should apply to all
individuals in removal proceedings—and certainly to all children—this article
focuses on why the right is particularly compelling for the subset of youth
apprehended internally. These youth frequently spend extended periods of time
in secure detention and face a greater likelihood of deportation, an extreme
penalty which even the Supreme Court in Padilla recognizes may be worse than
the criminal or juvenile sentence itself.
A.

Right to Counsel Under Gault

In Gault, the Supreme Court recognized that where an individual faces a
deprivation of his physical liberty, that individual must be provided an attorney
at government expense.266 In so holding, the Court explained, “Due process of
law is the primary and indispensable foundation of individual freedom. It is the
basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the
individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.”267 The
rationale behind the Court’s holding in Gault—that youth have a due process
right to counsel in civil juvenile delinquency proceedings because they face a
potential loss of liberty—would apply with equal force to youth in removal
proceedings.
As the Court recognized in Gault, the fact that juvenile detention is not
intended to serve as punishment does not matter to the youth who are
confined.268 Like youth in state juvenile detention, immigrant youth often
experience their time in detention as incarceration.269 In Gault, the Court
concluded that having an attorney is essential in delinquency cases where the
child faces “the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state institution until the
juvenile reaches the age of 21.”270
Youth in removal proceedings face indefinite detention. Youth
apprehended internally are generally placed in either staff-secure or secure
detention facilities.271 It is often difficult for youth transferred from the state
juvenile or criminal justice systems to obtain release from immigration detention
so they are frequently detained for longer periods of time.272 These youth end up
caught in a revolving door between state and federal detention.273 If an

265. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
266. Gault, 387 U.S at 36–37.
267. Id. at 20.
268. Id. at 27; see also Buss, supra note 108, at 503.
269. See supra Part II.D.
270. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36–37.
271. See supra Part II.
272. See Somers, Constructions of Childhood, supra note 2, at 348; Somers, Voice, supra note 9, at 8
(“However, there are due process concerns around the family reunification process and obstacles for
children in juvenile justice facilities.”).
273. See supra Part III.A.
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immigrant child is still in custody at age eighteen, that youth will be transferred
to adult immigration detention.274
Immigrant youth also face the harsh penalty of removal, a severe
infringement on liberty. In Lassiter v. Dep’t of Social Services, decided after Gault,
the Supreme Court held that court-appointed counsel may be required in any
civil case where the litigant “may lose his personal freedom” if he loses the
case.275 While it appears that Lassiter may refer only to a deprivation of physical
freedom by confinement, the rationale should extend to deportation, which the
Supreme Court has long recognized results in a deprivation of liberty potentially
more punitive than the penalty of imprisonment.276
As far back as 1922, the Court in Ng Fung Ho v. White stated that deportation
“deprives [the individual] of liberty” and may “result also in loss of both
property and life, or all that makes life worth living.”277 Similarly, in Bridges v.
Wixon, the Court acknowledged that in deportation proceedings, “the liberty of
an individual is at stake”278 and in Delgadillo v. Carmichael, the Court equated
deportation to “banishment or exile.”279 In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, the Court
further explained that “[a] deportation hearing involves issues basic to human
liberty and happiness and, in the present upheavals in lands to which aliens may
be returned, perhaps to life itself.”280 Finally, in Padilla, the Court equated the
prospect of deportation to the seriousness of a criminal punishment.281
Youth come to the United States for compelling reasons. Many are brought
to the United States by caregivers, often parents, and, therefore, deportation will
render them homeless and will result in separation from parents in the United
States.282 Other children come to find parents who came to the United States
years before, or are fleeing physical or sexual abuse, gangs, war, or other forms
of persecution.283 For such children, deportation may mean return to harm or
even death. Thus, as the Supreme Court recognized, deportation may be even
harsher than the penalty of confinement and thus constitutes a deprivation of
liberty.

274. ORR only has the responsibility of caring for “unaccompanied alien children” who are, by
definition, under eighteen. Homeland Security Act of 2002 §§ 462(a), (g)(2), 6 U.S.C.A. §§ 279(a), (g)(2)
(West 2002).
275. Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
276. See id.; Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480 (2010); see also Alice Clapman, Hearing
Difficult Voices: The Due-Process Rights of Mentally Disabled Individuals in Removal Proceedings, 45 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 373, 388 (2011).
277. 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
278. 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945).
279. 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947); see also Costello v. INS, 376 U.S. 120, 131 (1964) (“In this area of the
law, involving as it may the equivalent of banishment or exile, we do well to eschew technicalities
and fictions and to deal instead with realities.”).
280. 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950).
281. 130 S. Ct. at 1480 (recognizing that “deportation is an integral part—indeed, sometimes the
most important part—of the penalty that may be imposed on noncitizen defendants who plead guilty
to specified crimes.”).
282. See David B. Thronson, Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in Immigration Law, 38
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 393, 396–99 (2010); WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON &
SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 1.
283. Young & McKenna, supra note 1, at 248; BHABHA & SCHMIDT, supra note 1, at 20.
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Not only does the immigration system fail to extend the protections of Gault
to immigrant youth in removal proceedings, it actually undermines those
protections. As described earlier, a criminal defense attorney may get juvenile
records sealed, yet those sealed records are frequently admitted into immigration
proceedings and admissions contained therein may lead to deportation.
Similarly, criminal defense counsel may convince a judge to release a youth from
juvenile detention to family, only to have that child picked up by federal
authorities and transferred to immigration custody. In this way, the immigration
system frequently undercuts the protections of Gault.
The rationale of Gault supports the extension of court-appointed counsel to
youth in removal proceedings. Immigrant youth face a loss of physical liberty
and risk of deportation, another deprivation of liberty, and should, therefore, be
provided counsel at government expense.
B.

Right to Counsel to Ensure Fundamental Fairness

The Supreme Court has held that, pursuant to the Fifth Amendment right to
due process of law, individuals in removal proceedings must be provided an
“opportunity to be heard upon the questions involving [the] right to be and
remain in the United States.”284 The Board of Immigration Appeals has held that
due process requires that an individual is granted a “full and fair hearing.”285
A number of federal circuit courts have held that “in some circumstances,
depriving an alien of the right to counsel may rise to a due process violation.”286
Specifically, courts have repeatedly interpreted the deprivation of counsel as a
violation of the due process requirement that immigration proceedings be
“fundamentally fair.”287 In Aguilera-Enriquez v. INS, the court explained, “The test
for whether due process requires the appointment of counsel for an indigent
alien is whether, in a given case, the assistance of counsel would be necessary to
provide ‘fundamental fairness—the touchstone of due process.’”288 Similarly in
U.S. v. Campos-Asencio, the court held that “an alien has a right to counsel if the
absence of counsel would violate due process under the fifth amendment,”
meaning that without counsel a deportation hearing would be “fundamentally
unfair.”289
In Lin v. Ashcroft, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a fourteenyear-old asylum petitioner had been denied due process where counsel failed to
assist him in making his claims.290 The court held that the immigration judge
284. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 598 n.6 (1953).
285. In re Exilus, 18 I. & N. Dec. 276, 278 (B.I.A. 1982).
286. U.S. v. Torres-Sanchez, 68 F.3d 227, 230–31 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847
F.2d 1307, 1312–13 (9th Cir. 1988); Cobourne v. INS, 779 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1986); AguileraEnriquez v. INS, 516 F.2d 565, 568 (6th Cir. 1975); Castaneda-Delgado v. INS, 525 F.2d 1295, 1301 (7th
Cir. 1975); Rose v. Woolwine, 344 F.2d 993, 996 (4th Cir. 1965).
287. See, e.g., Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004); Castro-O’Ryan, 847 F.2d at 1313;
U.S. v. Campos-Asencio, 822 F.2d 506, 509–10 (5th Cir. 1987); Partible v. INS, 600 F.2d 1094, 1097 (5th
Cir. 1979); see also Johns v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 624 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that failure
to appoint a guardian ad litem for a minor in removal proceedings was a violation of due process).
288. Aguilera-Enriquez, 516 F.2d at 568 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
289. 822 F.2d at 509–10.
290. 377 F.3d at 1023–25, 1034.
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should have appointed competent counsel for this child, rather than going
forward with the child represented pro se. As the court explained, “Absent a
minor’s knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, the
[immigration judge] may have to take an affirmative role in securing
representation by competent counsel.”291 The court further stated, “[T]he right of
minors to competent counsel is so compelling that we have joined other circuit
courts in holding that a ‘guardian or parent cannot bring a lawsuit on behalf of a
minor in federal court without retaining a lawyer.’”292
Youth in immigration proceedings cannot have a “fundamentally fair
hearing” without counsel. As the Court recognized in Gault, fundamental
fairness requires procedures which are likely to produce accurate findings of
fact.293 The Ninth Circuit similarly recognized the importance of counsel in
ensuring a just result:
Over fifty years ago it was observed that in “many cases” a lawyer acting for an
alien would prevent a deportation “which would have been an injustice but
which the alien herself would have been powerless to stop.” Since 1931 the law
on deportation has not become simpler. With only a small degree of hyperbole,
the immigration laws have been termed “second only to the Internal Revenue
Code in complexity.” A lawyer is often the only person who can thread the
labyrinth. 294

Most youth without an attorney do not know how to present the necessary
evidence to support a request for any type of legal relief, and such requests are
therefore denied.295 When a youth appears before a judge on his or her own, even
for a routine continuance, the judge may question the child on the record. Many
children do not fully understand the questions they are being asked and may,
therefore, give incorrect answers. In some cultures, youth are taught to be
deferential to authority figures and they may, therefore, try to guess the “right”
answer, rather than answering honestly.296 Immigration proceedings often turn
on determinations of credibility and the slightest inconsistencies can result in a
denial; thus, any admissions on the record may be used to impeach a youth later
on.297 In many cases, youth are coached by their smugglers and traffickers to tell
a certain story to authority figures. If youth appear in court alone, they may feel
obligated to tell these false stories to the judge because this is what they have
been told to do. Getting at the truth of each situation is of course paramount.
These youth often need time to develop a relationship of trust with an attorney
before they will open up and share the truth.

291. Id. at 1034.
292. Id. (quoting Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997)).
293. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1967).
294. Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312–13 (9th Cir. 1988) (internal citations omitted).
295. See Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 661 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
296. Id. at 661.
297. See INA § 240(c)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B) (2006) (“[T]he immigration judge will
determine whether or not the testimony is credible . . . .”).
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Many youth in ORR’s secure and staff-secure facilities suffer from mental
illness.298 This adds another layer of complexity to the child’s case since these
youth may not be competent to appear in court without an attorney.299 As the
Supreme Court has stated, “There are some individuals who, by reason of age,
ignorance or mental capacity are incapable of representing themselves
adequately in a prosecution of a relatively simple nature.”300
It is widely recognized in other types of proceedings that children cannot
adequately represent themselves without counsel or a guardian ad litem. For
example, in 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA) which provides that in all judicial proceedings involving an abused
or neglected child, the interests of the minor must be represented by either a
guardian ad litem or a court-appointed special advocate.301 Some states require
that under certain circumstances, the child’s interests must be represented in
custody cases by either a court-appointed attorney or guardian ad litem.302 Still
other states allow for court-appointed counsel or a guardian ad litem to be
appointed for a minor in abortion or adoption proceedings.303 Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 17(c) provides that “[t]he court must appoint a guardian ad
litem—or issue another appropriate order—to protect a minor or incompetent
person who is unrepresented in an action.”304 Some courts have required the
appointment of a guardian ad litem for a child facing removal from the United
States.305
The risks of an unfair result for unaccompanied youth in immigration
proceedings are particularly great. As the Supreme Court recently recognized in
J.D.B., youth are more susceptible than adults to false confessions when they are
not represented by counsel.306 It is similarly much less likely that removal
proceedings will yield a fair outcome with accurate findings of fact when youth
are unrepresented.

298. WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N & ORRICK HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP, supra note 2, at 17
(“Staff in secure and staff-secure facilities expressed deep concern that many of the children placed
with them were there because of mental health issues and required more mental health services than
the facility was equipped to provide.”).
299. Clapman, supra note 276, at 384–95 (arguing for a due process right to counsel for mentally
incompetent adults).
300. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 684 (1984); see also Clapman, supra note 276, at 388–95
(discussing the rights of individuals who suffer from mental disabilities in immigration proceedings);
Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, No. 10-CV-02211 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2010).
301. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, § 5103(b)(2)(G) (1974)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5118); 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g) (2011).
302. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.12.175 (West 2011); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.310 (2011);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.401 (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 29 (West 2011).
303. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, §§ 2–3, ch. 112, § 12S (West 2011).
304. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
305. See, e.g., Johns v. U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 624 F.2d 522, 524 (5th Cir. 1980); see also CrommelinMonnier v. Monnier, 638 So. 2d 912, 916 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (“When a trial court is faced with the
proposed removal of minor children to a foreign country, the appointment of a guardian ad litem for
each child for the protection of their best interests will be required.”).
306. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, No. 09-1121, slip. op. at 5–6 (S. Ct. June 16, 2011).

Frankel_cpcxns (Do Not Delete)

12/21/2011 12:44 PM

DETENTION AND DEPORTATION WITH INADEQUATE DUE PROCESS
C.

103

Right to Counsel Under the Mathews v. Eldridge Balancing Test

Where an individual does not face a deprivation of personal liberty, the
courts must engage in the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test—a test established
by the Supreme Court in 1976—to determine what procedural due process
protections are necessary in civil cases.307 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme
Court held that a determination of the requisite procedural due process requires
a balancing of three key interests: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of
an erroneous result without the implementation of a certain protection and the
probable value of the proposed procedural safeguard; and (3) the government’s
interest, both fiscally and administratively.308
In Perez-Funez v. INS, the United States District Court for the Central District
of California engaged in the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to determine what
procedural due process protections were necessary to ensure the rights of
unaccompanied alien children subject to the INS’s voluntary departure
procedures.309 At issue was the INS procedure for asking youth to sign a
voluntary departure form waiving their right to a deportation hearing, without
the advice of a parent, guardian or counsel.310 The court held that the INS
procedures violated the due process clause and required that certain safeguards
be implemented, including ensuring that a youth from any country other than
Mexico or Canada311 receive advice from a parent, close relative, friend, or
lawyer, before signing the waiver.312 The court further noted that
“[c]ommunication with counsel would be preferable” as this is the best way to
ensure that children understand their legal rights fully; however, the court did
not go so far as to grant a right to government-funded counsel for all children.313
The court stopped short of granting this right in large part because of deference
to a prior decision by the Ninth Circuit holding that non-citizens are not entitled
to court-appointed counsel in removal proceedings.314
In conducting the balancing test, the court initially examined the private
interest at stake. The court reasoned that by signing a voluntary departure form,
the child waives his right to a deportation hearing and the right to relief from
removal.315 The court recognized that deportation implicates a substantial liberty

307. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
308. Id.
309. 619 F. Supp. 656, 659–69 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
310. Id. at 658–59.
311. The United States has an agreement with Mexico and Canada allowing youth from those
countries to be immediately returned to Mexican or Canadian immigration officials without being
taken into U.S. custody. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 1, at
4. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) now requires that these youth be
screened for trafficking and fear of persecution by U.S. authorities before being repatriated; however,
the TVPRA was not passed until 2008 and, therefore, was not in effect at the time that Perez-Funez
was decided. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act § 235(a)(2), (4), 8 U.S.C.A. §
1232(a)(2), (4) (West 2008).
312. Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 670.
313. Id. at 664–65.
314. Id. at 659 (citing Martin-Mendoza v. INS, 499 F.2d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1974)).
315. Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 656.
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interest—particularly given the tender ages of the class members—and that
children have a “special place in life which the law should reflect.”316
With regard to the risk of an erroneous result and the value of additional
procedural safeguards, the court relied on the testimony of expert witnesses. The
experts explained that “minors generally do not understand the concept of legal
rights without explanation,” that minors cannot make knowing and voluntary
decisions under stressful conditions, and that many of the children come from
cultures where it is natural to “defer to the authority before them.”317 The court
ultimately concluded that “the risk of erroneous deprivation is great” in such
circumstances.318 The court further explained that access to a telephone to call
family, a friend, or legal counsel prior to making a decision regarding the
voluntary departure form is “the only way to ensure a knowing waiver of
rights.”319 In so holding, the court recognized that “legal counsel certainly would
be the best insurance against a deprivation of rights.”320
Finally, with regard to the government interest at stake, the court
recognized that “the INS has an interest in ensuring that class members make
knowing and voluntary decisions,” and “to the extent that additional safeguards
preserve constitutional rights without unduly burdening the agency, such
safeguards are consistent with the INS’ interests and function.”321 The court
concluded that the procedural protections requested were not unduly
burdensome.322
Whereas Perez-Funez concluded that the advice of a competent adult—not
necessarily an attorney—was adequate to assist youth in making a knowing
decision regarding voluntary departure, most adults without experience in the
intricacies of the immigration system would be unable to advise a child on
immigration law.323 As Gault explained, “The juvenile needs the assistance of
counsel to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to
insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a
defense and to prepare and submit it.”324 This description would apply equally
to youth in immigration proceedings. Youth cannot adequately defend
themselves without “the guiding hand of counsel.”325 An attorney is necessary to
navigate the legal process. Furthermore, many unaccompanied minors may not
have a competent adult to stand with them in immigration court.
The concerns of the Perez-Funez court associated with requiring youth to
make knowing and voluntary decisions in the context of a highly stressful and
coercive situation would similarly apply to youth forced to defend themselves
316. Id. at 659–60
317. Id. at 661.
318. Id. at 659–60.
319. Id. at 664.
320. Id. at 665.
321. Id. at 661–63.
321. Id. at 666–67.
322. Id. at 667.
323. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (“Immigration law can be complex, and it
is a legal specialty of its own.”).
324. Gault, 387 U.S. 17, 36 (1967).
325. Id.
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against deportation in immigration court without an attorney. As the court in
Perez-Funez described:
[U]naccompanied children of tender years encounter a stressful situation in
which they are forced to make critical decisions. Their interrogators are foreign
and authoritarian. The environment is new and the culture completely different.
The law is complex. The children are generally questioned separately. In short, it
is obvious to the court that the situation faced by unaccompanied minors is
inherently coercive.326

This description could just as easily apply to minors facing an immigration judge
alone.
The 1985 decision in Perez-Funez stopped short of granting the right to
counsel at government expense; however, the court’s analysis would support the
extension of court-appointed counsel to immigrant youth today. Recent legal
developments suggest that courts may begin finding a right to counsel for certain
groups of non-citizens. For example, in Franco-Gonzalez v. Holder, a recent
decision by the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, the court
granted plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the class
members—a group of mentally incompetent non-citizen adults in removal
proceedings—were likely to succeed on the merits of their claim that they were
entitled to qualified counsel to represent them.327 The court thus enjoined all
further proceedings until plaintiffs were provided with qualified legal
representatives.328
Whether analyzed pursuant to Gault, the fundamental fairness standard, or
the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, it is clear that youth should be provided
counsel at government expense pursuant to the due process clause. Providing
counsel to such youth is a small price to pay to ensure a more fair outcome in
proceedings where youth are subject to detention and deportation, both
deprivations of liberty.
CONCLUSION
In most other proceedings in which children are the principal parties, the
law ensures that they have counsel to advise them before they appear before a
judge in recognition of the unique vulnerabilities of children.329 Yet in
immigration court, where decisions have a profound implication, the child must
often stand alone before a judge. A child in removal proceedings should never be
forced to appear before a judge by himself or herself, even if the minor is simply
asking for a routine continuance or voluntary departure. There is simply too
much at stake for these children.
Youth who end up in immigration custody by way of the criminal or
juvenile justice systems face a wide array of challenges. These youth are thrust
into a system that does not recognize the unique vulnerabilities of children. They
face extended periods of time in detention, and deportation to countries that they
326. Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 662.
327. No. 10-CV-02211 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 27, 2010) (order granting preliminary injunction).
328. Id.
329. See supra Part V.B.
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may not remember. Most importantly, many face long-term separation from
parents and siblings here in the United States or harm upon return to their home
country.
Although it is considered “civil,” the immigration system is quite punitive
and in many cases deprives youth of fundamental constitutional rights,
including the right to life and liberty. Youth often face the same harsh
consequences as non-citizen adults—automatic deportation and bars to return.
Although the Supreme Court in Padilla recognized the importance of advising
youth of the immigration consequences attendant to a guilty plea, the reality is
that many immigrant youth have no guarantee of an attorney to represent them
in their immigration proceedings, and thus face a high likelihood of deportation.
Lack of counsel for these youth is a violation of the due process right to a full and
fair hearing under the Fifth Amendment. Youth are particularly vulnerable, and
are therefore deserving of counsel at government expense.
In addition to the legal rationale, there are also a variety of reasons from
both a public policy and a human rights perspective why attorneys should be
made available for non-citizen youth. To begin, allowing interrogations by ICE in
juvenile detention centers fundamentally undermines the purpose of the juvenile
justice system, turning it into another ICE enforcement mechanism rather than a
system aimed at rehabilitating and reintegrating youth. Youth can no longer rely
on certain basic protections implicit in the juvenile delinquency system, like the
right to confidentiality or release from custody after serving a sentence. Such
immigration enforcement procedures will also likely deter many youth who are
victims of human trafficking or crimes in the United States from reporting to
state and local law enforcement for fear of being taken into ICE custody.330 It is
widely recognized that the 287(g) program serves to “erod[e] the trust and
cooperation of immigrant communities,” reduces public safety, and encourages
racial profiling.331 Such concerns about 287(g) have even been echoed by national
police organizations including The Police Foundation, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Major Cities Chiefs Association.332
At a time when federal and state budgets are limited and the government is
looking for places to cut spending, one might consider whether targeting
immigrant youth is the best use of resources. Given the findings in Dora Schriro’s
report that the ICE initiatives aimed at internal enforcement have only served to
increase the number of “non-criminal aliens” in custody, it is worth considering
330. See McKinley, supra note 4, at A12. Youth who are victims of human trafficking or victims of
crimes in the United States may be eligible for a T-visa or a U-visa; however, these visas generally
require a showing of cooperation with law enforcement. See INA §§ 101(a)(15)(T)(i), (a)(15)(U), 8
U.S.C.A. §§ 1101(a)(15)(T)(i), (a)(15)(U) (West 2010); INA § 101(a)(15)(U), 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(15)(U).
In many parts of the country where cooperation between state and local authorities and ICE is
common, police will refuse to sign the requisite certification necessary to enable a youth to obtain a T
or U visa. See Jessica Farb, The U Visa Unveiled: Immigrant Crime Victims Freed From Limbo, 15 No. 1
HUM. RIGHTS BRIEF 26, 27 (Fall 2007); Kevin Sieff, Victim of Smuggler's Negligence May Get Visa, THE
BROWNSVILLE HERALD, Aug. 31, 2008; Chris Casey, Shut Out: U Visa Program for Illegal Immigrants a
Hard Sell in Weld County, GREELEY TRIBUNE, July 18, 2010.
331. Letter from Marielena Hincapie, Executive Director of the National Immigration Law Center,
to Barack Obama, President (Aug. 25, 2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/
LocalLaw/287g-Letter-2009-08-25.pdf (521 organizations signed on to the letter).
332. Id.
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whether detaining youth who pose no threat to the community is worth the
cost—both in terms of the monetary cost and in terms of the chilling effect that
such policies have on victims reporting crimes and the impact on families.
Attorneys can help to ensure a more just outcome, as well as judicial
efficiency. Pro se litigation generally costs more and slows down the court docket.
With counsel, cases move more quickly. As one scholar explained, “from a
judicial administration perspective, courts do not have the resources to analyze
the factual nuances of each of these cases on an under-developed record without
briefing from counsel.”333
From a human rights perspective, we must seriously consider policies
which encourage the separation of parents and children. As Lorri A. Nessel,
Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Social Justice at Seton Hall
University argues, increased interior enforcement efforts have resulted in the
unfair breaking apart of many immigrant families.334 Ms. Nessel explains,
“Despite the central role that the family plays in United States immigration law,
and the protection afforded the family under international human rights law,
when deportation is at issue, individuals are increasingly being targeted for
removal with little attention paid to the impact on the remaining family
members.”335 Ms. Nessel further notes that “[t]his failure to consider the family
as an integral unit when making immigration decisions inevitably leads to an
influx of unaccompanied minors attempting perilous journeys to reunite with
their parent(s).”336 When one child is deported, parents are forced to choose
between returning to a country where they may be unable to provide for their
family or allowing their family to be broken up.
Even more importantly, the safety of children should be of paramount
concern. Representation helps to ensure that youth are not returned to conditions
where they risk physical harm. The Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act calls on the government to consider safety when
repatriating youth,337 yet in practice without counsel youth may not be able to
make the appropriate arguments or even identify the danger themselves.
Youth should be provided with counsel to ensure them a fair and
meaningful day in court and the opportunity to prove their right to remain in the
United States. In the meantime, without a right to court-appointed counsel, we
will likely see many more of these youth detained, deported, and separated from
their families.

333. Clapman, supra note 276, at 393.
334. Lorri A. Nessel, Families at Risk: How Errant Enforcement and Restrictionist Integration Policies
Threaten the Immigrant Family in the European Union and the United States, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1271,
1281–82 (2008).
335. Id. at 1281; see also STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 250
(4th ed. 2005) (“[O]ne central value that United States immigration laws have long promoted, albeit to
varying degrees, is family unity.”).
336. Nessel, supra note 334, at 1291.
337. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act § 235(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(5) (2006).

